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The al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, 
were not agents of a foreign government or a particular country. The nineteen hijackers 
who carried out the most deadly attack on American soil were devoted to an organization 
with a religious ideology that is dedicated to killing Americans and the ultimate 
destruction of the United States.1  This terrorist group is supported and protected by a 
covert and broad based network of devoted followers, including some rogue states, who 
provide financial and tactical support in order for the group to be successful.2 
The organizational make-up of al Qaeda presents many challenges and is 
relatively unique to the United States when comparing it to past enemies, military 
conflicts, or wars.  These terrorists have no geographical boundaries or identifiable 
infrastructure to retaliate against.  In fact, they reside in many of the world’s free 
societies, including the United States.  Their soldiers and other support personnel live in a 
clandestine manner, making them difficult to detect.  The al Qaeda operatives working in 
this capacity present themselves as law-abiding persons, assimilating into neighborhoods, 
schools, and work places.  Imbedding themselves into society, they patiently plan their 
next attack.3  They find innovative ways to communicate, organize, and formulate their 
missions without discovery.  In a sense, the persons within this terrorist organization are 
faceless. 
The complexity and open nature of American society combined with the 
country’s immense geographical boundaries make it seemingly infeasible to protect 
against an enemy with the versatility and motivation the likes of al Qaeda.  In fact, 
opponents of devising and implementing a strategic plan say it would be futile and not 
worth the effort.4  Critics, who maintain a homeland security plan is pointless, identify 
                                                 
1 Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America: from the Klan to al Qaeda (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2003), 119-121. 
2 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on al Qaeda (Arlington: RAND, 2002), 13-22. 
3 Ibid. 
4 David Carr, Futility of Homeland Defense, January 2002, available at  
http://www.theatlantic.com/2002/01/carr.htm, accessed on November 1, 2005. 
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gaping holes in our current protective mechanisms and surmise a successful plan to be 
out of reach.5  They say that America is in the untenable position of having an infinite 
number of ripe targets with a finite number of resources to provide protection.6  While 
the difficulties of fighting terrorism are vast and challenging, it is counterintuitive not to 
focus on prevention and protection as a means to fight the war on terrorism. 
The United States initially created an ad-hoc asymmetric strategy to influence and 
deter terrorists and displace their complex support system. This approach emphasized: 
• A powerful military response. 
• Greater intelligence gathering. 
• Increased information sharing among law enforcement agencies. 
• Economic sanctions against perpetrators (when possible). 
• An unyielding political philosophy to eliminate terrorism. 
• Collaboration with foreign countries. 
• The utilization of non-traditional governmental agencies. 7 
This multi-dimensional way of fighting terrorism has been effective, diminishing al 
Qaeda’s membership, resources, and system of support.8  Many of its operatives have 
been captured or killed during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and a large 
number of the group’s associates have been detected or disrupted through an aggressive 
and persistent application of intelligence and law enforcement investigations around the 
world.  However, this strategy is fashioned for the federal government and it does not 
address how local police may contribute to preventing and protecting from terrorist 
attacks.   
In July of 2002, the federal government published its plan for protecting America 
in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This document outlined the new policies, 
procedures, and responsibilities related to the prevention, protection, and response to 
terrorism for all levels of government. However, it only referenced local law enforcement 
                                                 
5 David Carr, Futility of Homeland Defense, January 2002, available at  
http://www.theatlantic.com/2002/01/carr.htm, accessed on November 1, 2005. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence, 24. 
8 Ibid. 
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as first responders, implying that these agencies did not have a role in the prevention or 
protection aspect of terrorism.  The strategy diminished the importance and potential 
impact local law enforcement contributed to stopping a terrorist attack before it occurred. 
Perhaps this approach was purposeful, reflecting the federal government’s belief that the 
nature of policing in the United States was far to splintered to be part of an effective 
prevention and protection mechanism against terrorism. Was the current structure of 
policing perceived to be inadequate for local cops to be successfully integrated into the 
nation’s preventative apparatus for the war on terrorism?  The development and history 
of the American police model is provided as support for this assumption. 
A. THE AMERICAN POLICE MODEL 
The industrial revolution and wealthy Americans interested in protecting their 
business interests were one of the main catalysts for the creation of modern police 
departments in the mid-nineteenth century within the United States.9  In many cities, 
street crime, mob violence and social unrest became commonplace.  The existing law 
enforcement mechanism struggled to suppress this anti-social behavior, resulting in the 
formation of individual municipal police departments for the purposes of order 
maintenance within specified jurisdictions.  These initial police departments grew in 
power and size, wielding great authority as they enforced stringent laws in a considerably 
tough socioeconomic time.10  Local politicians seized the opportunity to control these 
police departments in order to maintain power.11  As new towns and cities were 
established, an increasing number of independent police departments were soon created 
to keep the peace and deter criminal activity.  Each city devised its own police agency 
with different guidelines, operating procedures, and equipment.  At the time, there were 
no standards established for police departments and no governing body to determine best 
practices for this evolving profession, causing many of the initial police departments to 
be breeding grounds for graft, brutality, and ineffective policing.12 While many police 
reforms were theorized, actual change took over 50 years to occur.  During this time, a 
                                                 





decentralized police model had already taken shape across the nation.  Over several 
decades, studies of law enforcement practices in the United States were performed in 
hopes of improving the police profession and its structure.  The findings of these 
investigative bodies identified the same problematic thread: American law enforcement 
was far too decentralized.   
In 1933, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement was 
formed to study policing in the United States.  The Wickersham Report, as it was known, 
identified considerable problems consistent in urban police forces: 
The multitude of police forces in any state and the varying standards of 
organization and services have contributed immeasurably to the general 
low grade of police performance in this country.  The independence which 
police forces display toward each other in the absence of any central force 
which requires either a uniform or minimum standard of service leaves the 
way open for the profitable operation of criminals in an area where 
protection is often ineffectual at the best, generally only partial, and too 
frequently wholly absent.13 
In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice issued a report that studied policing. The commission described police 
departments as “fragmented, complicated, and frequently overlapping,” creating a 
country that had small police forces, each operating independently within the limits and 
jurisdiction of their imposed boundaries.14  It was the opinion of this commission the 
configuration of law enforcement was detrimental to producing effective results.  The  
commission recommended greater coordination, the sharing of resources, consolidating 
specialized units and merging police services into one larger body or entity in some areas 
of the country.15 
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals issued a report on the overall improvement in delivery of police services for greater 
protection against crime.  The commission believed there were too many police agencies 
in the United States, causing an inefficient and complex means of providing police 
                                                 
13 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Wickersham Report, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), 124. 
14 Daniel Skoler, Progress in Policing: Essays in Change (New York: Harper Press, 1980), 103-126. 
15 Ibid. 
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services.16  The commission suggested police jurisdictions consider combining services 
with other police departments or contemplate plans for total consolidation.17 
In 2002, President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address identified similar 
problems.  He proclaimed the need for federal, state, and local law enforcement officers 
to work together to gather intelligence and share information in order to fight terrorism 
and bolster homeland security.  President Bush identified a greater need for law 
enforcement to enhance agency-to-agency law enforcement coordination, 
communication, trust, and even consolidation of duties.18   
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission published its findings, making several important 
observations regarding the limitations of local government. They implied that a 
disintegrated system of government was an impediment to properly responding to the 
terrorist attacks. While the commission did not specifically identify the local police 
structure as the main issue, the commission’s analysis may be easily linked to problems 
associated with the lack of coordination among the many local governments.  
• The lack of radio interoperability hindered proper coordination of police and 
fire personnel. 
• The resources of local jurisdictions were overwhelmed where the hijacked 
airliners crashed.  
• Mutual aid among public safety jurisdictions was limited due to the legal risks 
associated with indemnification and liability.   
• Information and intelligence was not shared properly within the law 
enforcement community.19  
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The current American police model is outdated and does not provide local law 
enforcement the proper framework to effectively prevent, mitigate, and respond to 
terrorism.  With nearly 18,000 separate police departments in the United States, the 
                                                 
16 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (U.S. Government 
Printing Office: Washington D.C., January 1973), 108-155. 
17  Ibid. 
18 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address to Congress (January 29, 2002) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20021029-11.html, accessed on August 1, 2005. 
19 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2004), 319-397. 
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current system of policing is individualized, fragmented and disconnected.  With the 
proliferation of so many police organizations, contiguous agencies have overlapping 
jurisdictional responsibilities and job functions, leading to the waste of precious 
personnel resources.  Exacerbating this issue, radio systems and computerized databases 
among these law enforcement agencies are dissimilar or not linked, prohibiting local cops 
from easily communicating.  These technological gaps are the outcomes of the 
decentralized police model in existence today. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
local police must be configured in a manner to maximize the country’s counterterrorism 
efforts.   
As Americans have become more aware of terrorism and the possibility of future 
attacks, the demand for greater services in the form of enhanced security measures from 
their local police department has increased. Simultaneously, most levels of government 
are facing budget deficits, forcing them to tighten their belts, translating to a reduction of 
services. For most cities, police department costs are responsible for a high percentage of 
the municipal budget.  During times of economic hardship, city leaders look for ways to 
reduce the cost of providing police services.  Contrary to the idea of finding ways to 
reduce police costs, is the public demand for greater security from terrorism, as new 
equipment, training, and personnel are required to properly prevent and respond to 
terrorist acts. Financial restrictions that limit or reduce police resources strike at the very 
heart of the police consolidation debate as these mergers may make it possible for cities 
to actually increase services as a result of the savings incurred by consolidating.  How 
will municipalities meet the public’s expectation of increased security services in a 
climate of decreasing financial resources? 
For the federal government, the answer to this question has unfolded.  
Consolidating existing agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Customs and Border 
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, the United States Coast Guard, and the United States Secret Service created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The impetus to merge these federal 
departments came in the shadow of revelations that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not share information that may have 
 7 
impeded the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. DHS now wants to provide 
management of intelligence information in order to ensure appropriate analysis and 
action is performed on incoming information among all organizations, synchronizing its 
counter terrorism efforts. By placing these organizations under a unified command, a 
long-term goal to enhance unity of effort and purpose was placed in motion.   
For local law enforcement the answer is complicated. With limited resources and 
little expertise, most local police agencies do not have the ability to provide citizens with 
greater security against terrorists’ organizations the likes of Hezbollah, the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda. For these police departments, they may find what they are 
looking for in a consolidation with other police departments and the creation of a more 
centralized policing model.  
The idea of merging municipal police departments to form one larger agency was 
conceived a long time ago. The movements toward consolidation come and go with 
economic cycles, changing social ideologies, and divergence in governmental 
leadership.20  However, merging police departments for the purpose of preventing and 
protecting against terrorism has not been considered. For some government leaders the 
idea of combined municipal police departments to better serve a larger region is 
inevitable.  Underscoring this sentiment, then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge told a 
group of municipal leaders in 1996 that they could no longer bury their heads in the sand 
and function as though the rest of the state, nation, and world did not exist.  He explained 
to his reluctant audience that they must rid themselves of the mentality that supports the 
because-we-have-always-done-it-this-way ideology and urged them to lead through 
innovation and courage.  Ridge suggested that the geographical borders that current 
municipal leaders hold sacred are undeniably artificial in the face of today’s 
technological advances and global economy.  At this summit, Ridge called for the 
restructuring of government into a regionalized format.21  Successfully protecting the 
United States from terrorism will depend, to a significant extent, the way the government 
                                                 
20 Gary Halter, "City-City Consolidations in the United States," National Civic Review, Vol. 82 (May 
1993). 
21 Thomas L. Flannery, "Ridge Applauds Move toward Regionalism," Sweet Liberty, 1996, available 
at http://sweetliberty.org/issues.regionalism./ridge.htm , accessed on June 1, 2005. 
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organizes and structures itself to meet the threat.22 This thesis reviews the current 
policing model in the United States and the potential to alter it in order to maximize 
counter terrorism capabilities for the purpose of fighting terrorism.  
C. THINKING ANEW 
A viable model for the consolidation of police organizations may be drawn from 
the private sector.  Corporations merge all of the time, consolidating to form one entity.  
They build on the individual strengths of the other while eliminating the weaknesses, fat, 
and overlap that each would produce as an individual company.  A long list of banks, 
manufacturers, retailers, and telecommunications companies have followed a simple line 
of thinking:  two companies with the same focus join forces to form one entity, ideally  
saving money, cutting overhead, trimming expenses, and producing a better product 
through synergy.  Would it be possible for police departments to successfully do the same 
thing in order to fight terrorism? 
The recently released National Preparedness Goal (NPG) by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is acknowledgements for the need to create a new framework 
in order to successfully achieve the nation’s homeland security goals. DHS has 
established its national priorities as follows: 
• Implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National 
Response Plan (NRP). 
• Expand regional collaboration. 
• Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
• Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities. 
• Strengthen interoperable communications capabilities. 
• Strengthen CBRNE detection response and decontamination capabilities. 
• Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities.23 
As prescribed by three of the seven items on this list, DHS is desirous of having 
local governments increase prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities 
                                                 
22 Michael E. O’Hannon, Peter R. Orszag, Ivo H. Daalder, I.M. Destler, David L. Gunter, Robert E. 
Litan, and James B. Steinberg, Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis (Brookings 
Institute Press, Washington D.C.: 2002), 99. 
23 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, (Department of Homeland 
Security, December 2005), 14-20. 
 9 
that have greater impact over an increased geographic area through the expansion of local 
cooperative efforts.  The idea is to provide an increase of security capabilities that will 
benefit a greater number of people, impacting multiple communities.24  Creating 
successful regional initiatives will require cooperation and collaboration between public 
agencies on an unprecedented level.  When devising these strategies, leaders will be 
required to think anew.  Consolidating local police departments or the merging of specific 
police services may be a way to increase counter terrorism capabilities.  In a speech 
outlining the future agenda for DHS, Secretary Michael Chertoff quoted Abraham 
Lincoln to convey to his audience that fighting terrorism will require innovative thinking, 
resiliency, and change:    
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The 
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. 
As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must 
disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.25 
D. TYPES OF CONSOLIDATION  
There are a number of ways to consolidate local police resources.  Consolidation 
is a matter of degree, depending upon the ultimate goals of the involved police 
departments.  The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has described the 
different types of police mergers in the following manner: 
• Functional:  Two or more agencies combine certain functional units, such as 
emergency communications, dispatch or records.  
• Overlapping Jurisdictions: Agencies authorize each other’s officers to pool 
resources and improve regional coverage, for example, permitting a city 
police officer to make arrests in the county and a sheriff’s deputy to make 
arrests in the city. 
• Public Safety:  City or county governments may unite all police, fire, and 
emergency medical services agencies under one umbrella. 
• Local Merger: Two separate police agencies form a single new entity.  The 
agencies may be in small communities or metropolitan areas. 
                                                 
24 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, (Department of Homeland 
Security, December 2005), 14-20. 
25 Michael Chertoff, (remarks delivered to the Commonwealth Club, July 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.infragard.net/press_room/releases/chertoff_072805.htm, accessed on July 30, 2005. 
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• Regional:  A number of agencies combine to provide police services to a 
geographic area. 
• Metropolitan:  Two or more agencies serving overlapping jurisdictions join 
forces to become one agency serving an entire metropolitan area. 
• Government:  A city and adjoining county consolidate their entire 
governments, creating a metro form of government for all citizens.26 
While many mergers do not fit perfectly into these categories, the IACP 
guidelines assist in understanding the most common arrangements that are made between 
police organizations. The following examples provide context to the IACP list of possible 
configurations. 
The Las Vegas Nevada Metropolitan Police Department was formed through 
combining the Clark County Sheriff’s Department with the municipal police department 
of Las Vegas on July 1, 1973.27  Today, this police department serves the City of Las 
Vegas, boasting a population well over 1 million that encompasses 53 square miles.   An 
elected sheriff leads the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, serving a term of 
four years, while an appointed police commission approves this police department’s 
budget.28 The consolidation of these two entities was conducted by the Nevada State 
Legislature resulting from an outgrowth of the county and city governments offering 
overlapping services. This consolidation allowed for an increase of police services and 
elimination of duplication in area law enforcement, promoting efficiency and 
effectiveness in a large metropolitan area.   
One of the most significant consolidation of police agencies occurred in Canada.  
In 1974, the Peel Regional Police were formed after the incorporation of the former 
police departments of Mississauga, Port Credit, Streetsville, Brampton, and 
Chinguacousy.29  Today, this police force is the second largest municipal agency in the 
                                                 
26 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning 
Approach” (May 2003), 1-2. 
27 Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, “Consolidation of the Las Vegas Police Department 
and Clark County Sheriff’s Department”, available at http://www.lvmpd.com/overview/ovrcons.htm, 
accessed on November 30, 2005. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Peel Regional Police Department, “History of the Peel Regional Police Department,” available at 
http://www.peelpolice.on.ca , accessed on June 7, 2005. 
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Province of Ontario with over 2,000 full time employees, serving a population of over 
950,000.  The formation of this regional police department occurred as a result of the 
creation of the Regional Municipality of Peel, bringing all of the different city and county 
entities under one governmental structure.30  At the time this occurred, the idea of 
merging services and entire governments was an accepted mainstream solution to 
reducing costs within Canada.   
The State of California saw the cities of Larkspur and Corte Madera consolidate 
their individual police departments into the Twin Cities Police Authority in January of 
1980.31  The merger of these city police departments was the first in the state’s history. 
The Twin Cities Police Authority serves a citizenry of 21,000 with forty-four full time 
employees who provide full service policing to a geographic area of eight square miles.  
Larkspur and Corte Madera are located just eleven miles north of San Francisco.  The 
City of Larkspur and the Town of Corte Madera each provide two members of its elected 
council to form a four-member group that is responsible for policy development and 
oversight for their police force.32 The police authority was established through a joint 
powers agreement and its impetus was the desire to provide greater coordination, 
cooperation, and sharing in relation to police services.33  The consolidation quickly took 
action on this desire, as it formed a much needed traffic unit to properly mitigate an 
increasing traffic problem each city shared.  
In 1992, the City of Charlotte and the County of Mecklenburg combined police 
services between the existing city and county agencies.34  This police department consists 
of nearly 2,000 employees, serving 193 square miles and a population of nearly 700,000, 
covering the cities of Cornelius, Charlotte, Davidson, Huntersville, Mathews, Mint Hill, 
                                                 
30 Peel Regional Police Department, “History of the Peel Regional Police Department,” available at 
http://www.peelpolice.on.ca , accessed on June 7, 2005. 
31 Phillip D. Green, “Life after Consolidation: Traffic Enforcement Issues,” The Siren, December 
1984, available at http://www.ci.larkspur.ca.us/3070.html, accessed on June 7, 2005. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, About Us, available at 
http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/About+Us/Home.htm, accessed on June 1, 2005. 
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and Pineville.35 This is not an example of organizational consolidation, but of 
successfully merged police services.  Through carefully constructed contracts, the county 
sheriff and municipal police eradicated duplicate responsibilities and created a more 
efficient public safety partnership. Today, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 
is the largest police force between Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, Georgia.  
                                                 
35Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, About Us, available at 
http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/About+Us/Home.htm, accessed on June 1, 2005. 
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E. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research combines: 
• A review and analysis of the major issues surrounding police consolidation. 
• Two panel interviews with groups having law enforcement expertise 
organized within the context of a Nominal Group Technique (NGT). 
• A subject matter expert interview. 
• A case study of an existing consolidated police service model in Los Angeles 
County.   
This methodology is intended to assess the potential for local police consolidation 
or police service merger, determining if it is a more viable model to fight terrorism for 
local police departments. 
The first chapter introduces the area of study, while identifying the need for local 
police to become more involved in the war on terrorism.  This chapter outlines the 
American police model as a structural hindrance to providing the best possible defense to 
fight terrorism.  
The second chapter provides a review of the major issues concerning law 
enforcement mergers.  It illuminates the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
merging police agencies and/or consolidating police services. Understanding the themes 
in this chapter builds a foundation for evaluating the possibility of consolidating local 
police to create a more comprehensive framework to fight terrorism.  
The third chapter summarizes the results from panel interviews conducted within 
the format of a NGT.  These group discussions comprised a diverse group of 
professionals with law enforcement expertise providing different perspectives to the area 
of study. The group consisted of two Los Angeles County police chiefs, an elected city 
councilperson from the City of Pasadena, a captain from the California Highway Patrol, 
an attorney specializing in police litigation, a vice-president of a California-based utilities 
company in charge of security, and a professor from California State University, Los 
Angeles, who served as a member on the Commission on Police Standards and Training 
in California.   
The fourth chapter focuses on the issue of local control.  From the current 
literature and panel interviews, it is clear this is the most controversial and compelling 
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argument against the merging of police resources. This chapter analyzes this issue in 
relation to the results of the Kansas City Preventative Patrol experiment and several 
citizen satisfaction surveys from past mergers. 
The fifth chapter is a case study of the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST).  FAST 
combines eight municipal police departments operating under a joint powers agreement 
to provide airborne support to its members for the dual purpose of fighting crime and 
terrorism.  Operating in Los Angeles County FAST provides a template to meet the 
challenges of expanding local counter terrorism capabilities established by DHS.  The 
model turns theory into practice, demonstrating how consolidation may bolster the 
counter terrorism apparatus of local law enforcement. 
The final chapter provides a summary, three policy options, and a 
recommendation to alter police services as a means to fight terrorism.  It incorporates an 
interview with Assistant Chief David Stephens of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department, a subject matter expert in police mergers.   
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
There is no current literature that explicitly suggests that police consolidation or 
police service mergers may be a means to enable local law enforcement to be a more 
formidable force to fight terrorism.  This thesis will be the first research in this area.  
Data culled from this work will be utilized in order to conduct a policy options analysis 
for law enforcement professionals to consider, making the results of this research 




II. MAJOR ISSUES IN POLICE CONSOLIDATION 
A. FISCAL IMPACT 
For proponents of police consolidation, the most formidable argument in favor of 
merging resources is contained within the idea of cost savings.  For the most part, those 
who have researched the merging of police departments have discovered some sort of 
financial advantage to this centralized police model. However, it appears there is no 
consensus within the literature as it provides a dichotomy of results.   
A consolidated police feasibility study was undertaken for the cities of Bell, Bell 
Gardens, Commerce, Cudahy, and Vernon in 1980.  These cities are located in the Los 
Angeles basin, approximately ten miles from the City of Los Angeles.  At the time of this 
review, the Bell, Bell Gardens, and Vernon operated independent police departments, 
while Commerce and Cudahy contracted with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department.  The conclusion of the study recommended that these cities consolidate to 
form a single police department.36  The findings of the report projected the new merged 
police department would possess more patrol officers and more detective personnel, 
develop new specialized units, and save enough money to hire additional civilian 
employees to support more effective and economical police services.37   
This study suggested the departments would be able to eliminate overlapping 
assignments (i.e., K-9, crime prevention and background officers) by centralizing such 
units into one agency. The report studied the service demands in all of the cities and 
determined the workload did not support the need for each city to assign officers to a 
number of specific assignments.38  The additional officers would be sent to the patrol or 
detective sections, increasing personnel and services.  With additional officers, a 
specialized crime prevention unit was theorized to provide greater community contact 
and educational programs in the area of home and building security, drug intervention, 
and driver safety.  Several administrative positions such as police chief, commander, and 
                                                 
36 John P. Kennedy, Gary B. Adams, Gennaro F. Vito, “Consolidation of Police Services: An 




captain would be consolidated in this merger of the five cities.  The reduction of 
personnel costs at the top of the organization would theoretically provide funding for the 
hiring of civilian support personnel.  The study projected that the increase in civilians 
would allow police officers to spend more time on the street, resulting in a lower crime 
rate.39 
In 1997, a study compared the operational costs of the Northern York Regional 
Police Department (Pennsylvania) to the same number of independent municipal police 
agencies in a neighboring county.  The research identified the operational costs for the 
merged department to be 28% lower than the aggregate operational costs of the 
individual police departments used in the comparison.40 Additionally, the number of 
police officers per 1,000 residents was 34% lower, yet the regional police department was 
found to offer more services (K-9, detectives, and juvenile specialists), greater 
professional opportunities and increased salaries to its employees.41 
In a preliminary analysis published in 2005 for the possible law enforcement 
consolidation between the City of Indianapolis and Marion County (Indiana), data culled 
from these departments suggested a police merger would reduce overtime expenditures 
for each entity.42 The report formulated deployment models by combining the existing 
personnel resources from the independent agencies and demonstrated the ability for the 
merger to fill gaps in scheduling, reducing the amount of overtime spent.  The report 
concluded that the cost savings from reduced overtime was substantial as the police 
departments being merged were understaffed and relied upon overtime to fill vacant 
positions.43  This preliminary report suggested other areas of fiscal savings relating to 
liability.  The report suggested that a decrease in the number of high profile operational 
units equaled a reduction in the likelihood of incidents that bring lawsuits.  The analysis 
                                                 
39 Kennedy et al., Consolidation of Police Services,” 467. 
40 John T. Krimmel, “The Northern York County Police Consolidation Experience: An Analysis of the 
Consolidation of Police Services in Eight Pennsylvania Rural Communities,” Policing: An International 
Journal of Police Strategies and Management (1997), 497-507. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Wabash Scientific, Inc., “Indianapolis/Marion County: Law Enforcement Consolidation: Phase I 
Preliminary Report,” (August 19, 2005), 24. 
43 Wabash Scientific, “Indianapolis/Marion County,” 15. 
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projected lower insurance rates and decreasing workers compensation claims due to the 
sheer reduction in risk associated with liability.   
The fiscal savings derived through consolidation appears to be relative to the 
involved agency’s budget.   While an estimated $3.6 million was projected to be saved 
annually in the consolidation between Indianapolis and Marion,44 the smaller 
consolidation study between police in the City of St. Mary’s and Camden County, 
(Georgia) in 2004 was estimated to be $673,775 each year.45  For both, the monetary 
savings is attributed to the consolidation of management, facilities, support services, 
personnel benefits, and the elimination of redundant duties at the line level.  While the 
savings appeared to be more in Indiana, it was equal to the amount saved in Georgia, 
relative to the total budgets of the independent police departments being reviewed. 
While savings is projected under most police consolidations, it may be a short-
term result.  There is evidence that law enforcement services over a longer period of time 
suffer cost increases that lead to “diseconomies of scale.” 
Economies of scale occur when mass-producing a good or service results in a 
lower average cost.  With the elimination of personnel in redundant assignments through 
consolidation, police departments are theoretically able to reduce overall costs while 
increasing services and/or providing the same services to a larger number of citizens, 
initiating economies of scale, enjoying reduced costs.  However, if service demands 
increase over time, requiring additional police officers, the cost for services increases.  If 
output does not increase in a commensurate fashion with cost, diseconomies of scale 
occur, eliminating the cost savings achieved through consolidation. If consolidation cost 
savings is to be used to bolster local law enforcement personnel resources to better fight 
terrorism, it is pertinent to understand this economic premise and the possible limitations 
that may exist.  This issue is difficult to analyze, as police services are difficult to 
measure in economic terms. The research in this area is ambiguous.  A study concluded 
                                                 
44 Wabash Scientific, “Indianapolis/Marion County,” 9. 
45 Carl Vinson Institute of Government, “A Study of the Potential for Outsourcing Police Services in 
the City of St. Mary’s” (July 29, 2004), 8. 
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in 1975 established the idea that police services enjoyed economies of scale,46 but studies 
conducted in 1987 and 1990 refuted the earlier study with a more comprehensive 
methodology, providing data showing police services experiencing diseconomies of scale 
over the long run.47,48 This is an important issue, as it suggests there are limits to 
expanding police services throughout a region before costs for services begin a return to 
pre-consolidation levels. 
Transition costs are the one-time expenditures directly related to the actual 
consolidation and most commonly fall in the category of communication devices 
(computers and radios), uniforms, vehicles, equipment, training, and facilities. While 
financial savings may occur when police departments consolidate, the transition costs are 
commonly overlooked or miscalculated, off-setting the net savings.49  In the 
consolidation between the police departments in the City of Louisville and Jefferson 
County, Indiana, transition costs were greatly underestimated.50  Radio infrastructure 
required replacement at the cost of $50 million, along with facility refurbishment totaling 
$2.5 million.51  For the city-county consolidation of the City of Indianapolis and Marion 
County, Indiana, the single transition cost of vehicle standardization was estimated to be 
a whopping $3.2 million.52  Opponents of consolidation suggested that these one-time 
costs are usually underestimated and reduce or completely eliminate the savings 
projected under merged departments.53  
 
 
                                                 
46 Jeffrey L. Chapman, Werner Z. Hirsch, and Sidney Sonenblum, “Crime Prevention, the Police 
Production and Budgeting,” Public Finance, Vol. 30, no.2 (1975): 197-215.  
47 Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, “Economies of Scale in Municipal Police Departments: The Case in 
Florida,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 69, no.2 (1988): 352-356. 
48 Anthony O. Gyapont and Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, “Factor Substitution, Price Elasticity of 
Demand and Returns to Scale in Police Production: Evidence from Michigan,” Southern Economic 
Journal, Vol. 15, no. 2 (1990): 863-878. 
49 Wabash, “Indianapolis/Marion County,” 16. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 19. 
53 Ibid. 16. 
 19 
B. EXPERIENCE AND PROFESSIONALISM 
Of the nearly 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United 
States, 52% employ fewer than ten full-time police officers, 31% employ fewer than five 
full-time police officers and 11% employ only one full-time police officer.54 These 
jurisdictions serve small populations and are not exposed to many of the complex 
criminal, political, or socially challenging issues facing larger police agencies. As a 
result, the police officers and civilian employees associated with these smaller agencies 
are less likely to develop expertise in many of the fields that counterparts achieve in 
larger police departments.55 Combining smaller police departments via consolidation 
exposes small city police employees to a larger geographical area, which provides greater 
exposure to specialized assignments, larger populations, diverse citizens, and more 
complex situations, creating a more experienced and professional police department over 
time.56  
C. INCREASED CRIME FIGHTING CAPABILITIES 
The invisible boundaries erected by governments that separate one jurisdiction 
from another do not halt the movement of crime. Persons who break the law move from 
city to city, allowing the opportunity to lead them to their next victim. As transportation 
corridors have connected urban centers to surrounding suburbs, criminals have become 
regional in nature, creating a more complex problem for law enforcement. It is not 
uncommon for a series of robberies or burglaries to involve victims from a variety of 
municipalities. Under the decentralized police model, individual police agencies 
investigate such serial crimes without detecting the existing crime pattern.  
Criminal activity moves from location to location, depending on the level of law 
enforcement resources assigned to combat it along with the level of intensity applied.57  
As crime increases in a specific area of a city, police usually respond with greater 
measures to eliminate it.  While some suspects are arrested, the criminal element is not 
                                                 
54 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Census of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies 2000 (October 2002), 3. 
55 Wabash, “Indianapolis/Marion County,” 55. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Calvin McNeil, “Police Protection and the Spatial Concentration of Crime: Evidence from Los 
Angeles,” Graduate Thesis, San Diego State University (May 2000), 5-6. 
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completely eradicated.  In fact, crime is usually relocated to another portion of the beat, 
city, county or adjacent jurisdictions where the probability of arrest is lowest and police 
resources are disproportionately allocated.58  Terrorists, like other criminals, are able to 
exploit this weakness. Police resources would be more effective if they were deployed in 
a regional fashion, evenly concentrated to deter criminal activity.59 As terrorists operate 
in a network fashion, they utilize cells of people to coordinate different tasks of any given 
operation.60 It would seem, “whoever masters the network form stands to gain the 
advantage.”61 
If such a terrorist network were spread over several municipalities, local 
jurisdictions would have a difficult if not impossible job connecting the dots and 
preventing a terrorist attack. A consolidation of police agencies provides a strategy that 
evens out the distribution of resources and matches the network operation of criminals 
and terrorists.  Merging police organizations, or specific services, begins the process of 
network policing in order to properly format law enforcement resources in order to fight 
terrorism. 
D.  LOCAL CONTROL 
While consolidation may offer a fiscal savings, opponents contend such 
compensation is not enough for communities to forfeit control of their police. They 
suggest that small police agencies are more responsive to citizens and provide services 
tailored to meet the needs of smaller communities, adding great value to police services 
that community members do not want to relinquish. With consolidation, local citizens 
and politicians are perceived to have a diminished role in the decision making process, as 
the larger consolidated agency has an increased number of stakeholders, a more diverse 
list of issues to handle, and additional layers of bureaucracy, creating an atmosphere of 
disenfranchisement between police and locals.62  A police department that is responsible 
for a larger geographic area is required to make decisions based upon the good of the 
                                                 
58 McNeil, “Police Protection,” 6-7. 
59 Ibid. 
60 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy (Arlington: RAND, 2001), 16. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Sinden, “Issues.” 
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entire region, versus the good of the individual neighborhood or local politico.63 With 
consolidation, local community interests have the potential to become blurry, as the 
merged police department focuses on the entire region. The issue of local control is the 
dominating argument by opponents of police mergers.  The NGT process conducted for 
this research confirmed the importance of this issue and as a result, Chapter IV was 
created to further explore and analyze this important topic.   
E. EMPLOYEE DISCONTENT 
Most employees are comfortable with the status quo.  Introducing different ideas 
and alternative ways of doing things creates discomfort for most workers.  The 
consolidation of police departments places a great strain on employees as changes occur 
within the organization.  As police agencies undergo the process of a merger, cultures 
clash as different philosophies, ideals, values, and personalities begin forging together.64 
Any merger can be foiled by the fusion of incompatible cultures as it disrupts the 
everyday business of the police department.65 If not managed properly, these internal 
problems can negate the goals that consolidation is attempting to achieve.  
Organized employee police unions have resisted supporting consolidation efforts 
due to the varied benefit packages that exist among neighboring police agencies.  Police 
association leadership fears a reduction in salary, benefits, and other working condition 
issues that directly impact their membership.66  They believe managers will be desirous 
of utilizing the lowest possible salary and benefit ranges when consolidating 
organizations in order to achieve a savings. 
The next chapter summarizes two panel interviews conducted within the structure 
of a Nominal Group Technique (NGT).  Each of the panels was asked to consider a more 
centralized police model and whether or not it provided greater protection from terrorism. 
Data from these panels is utilized to create three future outcomes for consideration.   
                                                 
63 Sam Staley, “Bigger is Not Better: The Virtues of Decentralized Local Government,” CATO 
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65 Ibid. 
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III. NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A nominal group technique (NGT) is a structured workshop that brings together 
panelists in order to identify trends and events as they relate to the topic of discussion.  A 
facilitator, or third party, ushers the panel through this process, assists in the clarification 
of any information, lends insight to discussion, and ensures that the group does not stray 
from its intended purpose.  As a part of the NGT, each participant provides information, 
from his or her perspective, on the topic.  Panelists are asked not to be judgmental or 
provide commentary when others are providing input.  Prior to any group discussions, the 
panel is provided with a description of the issue, the definition of a trend and an event, 
along with an overview of the NGT process. After a brainstorming of ideas, the group is 
then allowed to discuss each of the panelist’s statements and provide clarifying 
information if necessary.  A ranking of the ideas follows and an order of importance and 
magnitude of each is established. Similar processes have proven to be a viable technique 
for police organizations to utilize when attempting to forecast specific issues the agency 
may face in the future.67 
For the purposes of this thesis, two panels were convened.  The first group 
represented an integrated group of seven professionals with experience in the fields of 
business, education, law, law enforcement, and politics. The second one consisted of six 
law enforcement officers from diverse backgrounds and ranks with over 100 years of 
combined police experience.  The topic of discussion or question asked to each panel 
member was:  “Is police consolidation or the merger of specific police services a more 
effective and efficient means to combat terrorism than the current decentralized police 
model?”  Each of the groups was asked to consider this question when identifying trends 
and events as part of the NGT exercise.   
For the purposes of these panel discussions, a trend was defined as something that 
had social, technological, economic, environmental, or political characteristics and may 
                                                 
67 William Tafoya, “A Delphi Forecast of the Future of Law Enforcement” (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University Microfilms International, 1986). 
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be measured or estimated over a period of time.  The participants were told to think of 
trends as occurrences with gradual and long term characteristics.  An event was defined 
as something that occurred at a specific time and date.  The panels were told that events 
were unambiguous, confirmable and had the potential to change future.  It was explained 
that events were different than trends, as events were singular incidents and did not 
reoccur.68   
1. Interpreting the Trend Table 
For each trend identified, the panelists were asked to assign the arbitrary score of 
100, which represented a baseline measurement and the current state of the trend. After 
this was established, the panelists were asked to evaluate the direction of each trend five 
years in the past, along with five and ten years in the future, assigning a number that was 
either lower or higher than the established baseline (100).   
In the example below (Table 1), the first trend, or Tr-1, is viewed as doubling in 
five years to 200 and then increasing to 250 in ten years from its current baseline of 100.  
Additionally, Tr-1 is perceived to be fifty, or only half the value, when comparing it five 
years in the past (-5) to the established baseline today.  Thus, the first trend in the 
example table is viewed as constantly increasing over a twenty-year period. The second 
trend, Tr-2, was twice as high (200) five years ago when comparing it to the baseline of 
today (100).  This second trend decreases in veracity to seventy-five and then to twenty-
five five and ten years in the future, respectively.  Tr-2 is observed to be constantly 
decreasing over time.  
Table 1.   Example Trend Table 




+5 years  
(future) 




Tr-1 50 100 200 250 9 
Tr-2 200 100 75 25 5 
Last, the panel members were asked to provide an individual concern level for 
each trend, as it related to the issue or question being asked.  Utilizing numbers between 
one and ten (one for a low concern level and ten for a high concern level), the panel 
measured the perceived impact of the trend on the issue being discussed.  The higher 
number posted in the concern level reflected the participant’s opinion that the trend 
                                                 
68 Tom Esenten, Lecture, California Police Officer Standards and Training, Command College Class 
#33, Lecture (San Marcos, California, November 2001). 
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would have great impact, while the lower number suggested the idea that the trend would 
have little or no effect.  The example table depicts a high concern level with a 
measurement of nine. 
2. Interpreting the Event Table 
For each event identified, the panelists were asked to project the first year when 
they felt the event had a 1% chance of occurrence.  After this was established, the 
participants were asked to estimate the event’s probability of occurrence, as a percentage, 
by assigning a value between 0 to 100%, for five (+5) and ten years (+10) in the future. 
Last, the panelists were required to identify the impact of each event by the issuance of a 
number between –10 and +10, with the highest positive number having the greatest 
impact and the highest negative number having the least impact to the issue being 
discussed. 
In the example below (Table 2), the first event, or Ev-1, is perceived to be initially 
possible in three years.  The example table shows the probability of Ev-1 increasing to 
50% in five years and becoming a certainty, or 100%, over the course of ten years. This 
table also indicates the second event, or Ev-2, is projected to have its first possibility of 
occurrence in seven years, making Ev-2’s occurrence in five years a 0% probability.  
However, in ten years Ev-2 has a 10% probability of occurrence.   
Table 2. Example Event Table 
Event (Ev) Year(s) > 0 





Impact –10 to +10 
Ev-1 3 50% 100% -8 
Ev-2 7 0 10% +8 
The impact of Ev-1 in the example table is rated -8.  This number is interpreted to 
mean the event has little or no impact on the issue being studied.  However, Ev-2 in this 
example is rated as having great impact, as it was issued a score of +8.   
3. Interpreting the Cross Impact Analysis Table 
The panels were asked to assess each event and its impact on every trend, 
providing a cross-impact analysis. Participants provided input for this analysis through 
discussion and eventual assignment of a numeric value depicting each impact. If the 
panelists provided the number of zero, it meant that they perceived the event had no 
impact on the trend. If they believed that the event had a positive impact (judged as 
“good”) on the trend, a positive number ranging from one to five was assigned with the 
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higher number indicating the more positive impact of the event on the trend.  If the 
panelists believed that the event had a negative impact (judged as “bad”) on the trend, a 
number ranging from –1 to –5 were assigned with the higher number indicating the more 
negative impact of the event on the trend.  In the example below (Table 3), Ev-1 is 
measured as having no impact on Tr-1, but having the highest possible positive impact on 
Tr-2.  Ev-2 is depicted as having a slight positive impact on Tr-1 and the greatest possible 
negative impact on Tr-2. 
Table 3. Example Cross Impact Analysis Table 
 Tr-1 Tr-2 
Ev-1 0 5 
Ev-2 1 -5 
This portion of the analysis is highly subjective and may be viewed differently 
depending upon point of view.  The panels’ trends and events were tabulated to reflect 
the average values associated with each.  This accumulated information allowed for the 
easy identification of divergent views and areas of congruence among the participants.   
B. PROFESSIONAL PANEL RESULTS 
1. Trends 
The professional panel identified twenty-five trends.  The panel ranked five of 
these as being the most significant.  These five trends are designated as Tr-1 through Tr-5 
and are summarized in Table 4.  A synopsis of the panel discussion for each of the trends 
is provided below. 
Table 4. Trends (Professional Panel) 
Trend (Tr) -5 years Today +5 years +10 years Concern Level 
(1-10) 
Tr-1 71 100 157 255 8 
Tr-2 85 100 120 122 5 
Tr-3 95 100 102 91 10 
Tr-4 75 100 125 150 8 
Tr-5 90 100 138 175 5 
Tr-1= Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs. 
Tr-2= Liability exposure for law enforcement. 
Tr-3= Desire to have local control of police. 
Tr-4= Cost of police personnel. 
Tr-5= Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry. 
The first trend (Tr-1) identified by the panel was “resource sharing by cities to 
enhance effectiveness and lower costs.” The panel believed that cities have increased 
their awareness to the benefits of joining forces.  Participants agreed that cities working 
in unison have the potential to gain greater political clout, reduce cost with less 
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duplication, and increase purchasing power in the market place.  The panel felt that over 
the next five and ten years, municipalities would increase the trend of resource sharing 
from today’s baseline of 100 to 157 and 255, respectively.  The participants rated the 
concern level of this trend at a high level (8) and observed that resource sharing would 
have a direct impact on the development of a consolidated municipal police department 
or the sharing of specific police services in the future. One of the panelists used a recent 
example of his city joining with three others to purchase a power production facility out 
of state to ensure a consistent flow of electricity to citizens.  Another panelist suggested 
that resource sharing would happen incrementally and often.  This person explained how 
politicians, city managers, and citizens will use this strategy, become familiar with its 
successes and, as he stated, “After traveling down this road, the city will turn around and 
look what has been accomplished with such cooperative efforts and realize that there is 
no way to go back.” This panelist suggested that this would eventually lead to the 
acceptance of merging services or even consolidating municipal police departments.  One 
of the private sector panelists explained how consumers would drive the phenomenon of 
merged police departments. He believed that resource-sharing will increase as consumers 
will want “one-stop shopping,” and will have a desire to cut back on the duplication of 
government services and overall bureaucracy. 
The second trend (Tr-2) identified by the panel was “liability exposure for law 
enforcement.”  The participants all observed this issue as increasing, slightly, issuing this 
trend a score of 120 in five years and 122 in ten years from the baseline of 100.  The 
concern level of this trend and its impact on a consolidated police force was only ranked 
as moderate (5).  However, the panel was clearly split on this issue.  One group supported 
the idea that a consolidated police force would create consistency in the areas of training, 
policy implementation, and operations along with an effective tool to communicate 
information.  The group thought these advantages would devise an agency that decreased 
its exposure to liability.  The other group argued that the creation of a larger police entity 
would make it more difficult to implement accountability, leadership, vision, and 
establishing proper day-to-day procedures.  This group thought the larger agency would 
increase police liability due to these difficulties.  
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The third trend (Tr-3) identified by the group was “the desire to have local control 
of police.”  The panel believed there would be a very small increase in this trend over a 
five-year period, increasing from the baseline of 100 to a mere 102.  However, they 
believed this trend would eventually decrease in a ten-year period to 91. During the 
discussion, the participants agreed that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, along 
with greater acceptance and successes of the sharing of resources (Tr-1) by municipalities 
would cause a shift in thinking for politicians and the public.  The group theorized that a 
larger police department with more resources would offer greater prevention against 
terrorism and bring greater services to the public.  One of the participants disagreed.  This 
panelist is a local politician and his perspective was much different from the members of 
the group. This participant said it was his belief that community members would want 
their own police department and not want to become a member of a larger consolidated 
agency.  It was his opinion that citizens would place great pressure on elected officials to 
oppose mergers in order to retain individual police departments and the citizens’ rights to 
direct local resources.  This panelist said the merger of police departments was contrary 
to the ideals of community policing and the goals of increasing citizen-police 
relationships. He explained that a larger police agency would result in less access, 
contact, and collaboration with police officials. This trend was clearly controversial, with 
the concern level being established at the highest level (10). 
The fourth trend (Tr-4) identified by this panel was “the cost of police personnel.”  
The group was cohesive on this trend as it described the increasing personnel costs in the 
law enforcement profession and the decreasing ability for a city to increase its revenue.  
The panel scored the trend as 75 five years ago, and 125 five years in the future, 
escalating to 150 ten years.  Tr-4 showed a continuing increase over the course of the 
entire twenty-year period. The panel discussed increasing interest rates, the high price of 
gasoline, reduced desire of citizens to pay greater taxes, and the average city’s inability to 
generate revenue through business growth initiatives.  They described an inverse 
relationship between the cost of police personnel and the revenue generated by municipal 
governments. The participants’ concern level for this trend was very high (8), as they 
believed the impetus to form a consolidated police department would come directly from 
the need to reduce costs.  Each of the panelists agreed that approximately 90% of the 
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expense to provide police services involved personnel costs. One of the local police 
chiefs on the panel stated the cost of his city’s retirement had increased by 23% over the 
course of two years due to increased retirement plans.  He stated the escalating retirement 
costs may cause some municipalities to seek contract or shared services, which could 
quickly turn into some sort of merged effort.   
The fifth trend (Tr-5) identified by the participants was “the level of police 
service demands due to a more diverse citizenry.”  The panelists specifically noted the 
increased number of citizens who speak multiple languages and have different cultural 
norms, a continually increasing Hispanic population, and the need to provide specialized 
services to an exploding population of elderly.  The participants believed that community 
members have become less homogeneous than in the past and will continue to get more 
complex and diverse.  The panel calculated that demands on police services would 
increase from a baseline of 100 to 138 in five years and increase to 175 in ten years.  The 
panel suggested the growing diversity of the citizens would place greater demands on law 
enforcement as police personnel would have to become familiar with a variety of 
languages, customs, and other special needs.  All but one of the panelists rated the 
concern level of this trend as moderate (5) to the impact of a consolidated police force.  
The individual panelist who perceived this trend differently was a professional in the 
private sector who had experience dealing with many entities on a regional basis with his 
company’s service.  This panelist believed that a more regionalized police department 
allowed for greater resources in the area of language and cultural diversification along 
with increased abilities to provide more innovative ideas to deal with a change in the age 
demographic.  The idea from this panelist centered on synergy and the philosophy that 
input from more people would bring greater solutions.  He also believed that a 
consolidation of police agencies would create a larger pool of employees who would 
provide a diversity match to the citizens being served, making the police department 
more adaptable to the coming demographic changes. 
2. Events 
The professional panel identified twenty-five events they felt would change the 
future and possibly lead to the development of consolidated police departments or 
increased service mergers.  The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant.  
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These five events are designated as Ev-1 through Ev-5 and are summarized in Table 5.  A 
synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each event is provided below. 
Table 5. Events (Professional Panel) 
Event (Ev) Year(s) > 0 +5 years +10 years Impact –10 to +10 
Ev-1 1 100% 100% +9 
Ev-2 12 0% 0% +5 
Ev-3 2 24% 47% +7 
Ev-4 4 13% 33% +3 
Ev-5 9 0% 4% +10 
Ev-1=A second large terrorist attack on the United States. 
Ev-2=A catastrophic natural disaster. 
Ev-3=A catastrophic communication failure between police departments. 
Ev-4=An open border with Mexico. 
Ev-5=Police officers forming a statewide union. 
The first event (Ev-1) that was identified by the group was “a second large-scale 
terrorist attack on the United States.”  The participants felt that the United States would 
be subjected to more terrorist attacks in the future.  During the discussion, the panelists 
described the environment of Israel and the way individual suicide bombers infiltrate 
public areas and kill themselves and Israeli citizens.  The entire group believed that 
America would be subjected to daily attacks and eventually a very large plot, much like 
the one that occurred on September 11, 2001.  It was the consensus of the participants 
that the adversarial ideals of freedom and security would be the greatest weakness the 
country would face in its fight against future terrorist acts.  The panel members believed 
that Ev-1 had at least a 1% probability of occurring within the next one or two years and 
a 100% chance of occurring within the next five years, making it a 100% chance of 
occurrence in ten years as well.  The group explained that Ev-1 would have a great 
impact on the initiation of creating a more centralized policing model to combat the tide 
of terrorism.  The participants explained that individualized law enforcement agencies 
would struggle to prevent and respond to a major terrorist attack.  The group decided the 
occurrence of another large terrorist attack would force law enforcement agencies to 
collaborate and join forces in order to overcome the numerous impacts of such an event.  
It was theorized that police collaboration over this event would demonstrate the 
effectiveness of such a centralized police model, creating a desire to join forces on a 
permanent basis.  The panel rated the impact of this event to be significant in the 
development of a regional police force.  The panel demonstrated their strong feelings of 
this event’s impact with a score of +9. 
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The second event (Ev-2) the panel identified was “another catastrophic natural 
disaster.”  Members of the panel described the impacts of Katrina and the failure of local 
government to provide for the safety of citizens before, during, and after the event.  The 
group believed city officials failed to properly manage local police resources, leading to 
further challenges remaining in the area.  The participants in the discussion believed a 
second disaster of this magnitude would force municipalities to investigate a better means 
to provide public safety.  They spoke of a future earthquake with the magnitude to cause 
long-term electricity scarcity, water and food shortages, and transportation stoppages, 
along with short/long-term communication impediments.  The participants displayed a 
great amount of variance in their anticipated timeline for such a natural disaster to occur.  
The first years of probability ranged from one, three, five, five, ten, ten, and fifty years 
among the panelists.  They addressed these diverse scores by describing nature as 
unpredictable, with a catastrophic event having the ability to occur at any time.  They 
thought the range of scores was easily explained as each of them considered the difficulty 
in predicting such an event.  As a result of the wide range of scores, the panel’s average 
first year for probability of occurrence for this event was twelve years, resulting in a zero 
probability within the five and ten year time span.  An interesting discussion took place 
regarding the impact of such a disaster on the formation of a consolidated police force.  
The two police chiefs on the panel believed that the occurrence of Ev-2 would cause such 
great strain on local citizens that municipal police departments would be forever left as a 
decentralized police model since citizens would fear not having their own exclusive 
police department and resources they could rely upon.  The other panel members believed 
the opposite, and identified Ev-2 much like Ev-1, as a galvanizing force for the initiation 
of a regional policing effort.  Consequently, the impact level of Ev-2 was considered 
moderate, as the group was split on this topic. 
The third event (Ev-3) identified by the group was “a catastrophic communication 
failure between police departments.”  On a day-to-day basis, the panel felt that law 
enforcement did not communicate effectively with each other.  Some examples were 
noted where a crime occurred across jurisdictional boundaries and several police agencies 
working together on a case had not received all of the necessary information from each 
other.  The participants felt that a very important incident (i.e., a criminal investigation, 
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terrorist act, or localized emergency) would occur where it would be imperative for 
several law enforcement agencies to communicate information, share intelligence, and 
routinely organize themselves to be effective to complete the task at hand.  The panel felt 
such an incident would present itself, and based on a sordid history of poor 
communication between agencies, the involved police departments would fail miserably 
and cause the loss of life and destruction of property, causing public confidence in the 
decentralized police model to become wanting. One of the panel members noted the 
communication failure between federal law enforcement agencies before September 11, 
2001.  He explained further by telling the group of the 9/11 Commission findings that 
these agencies did not share information that may have been able to stop the attacks.  The 
panel member felt the consolidation of federal law enforcement under the umbrella of 
DHS would be mimicked by local police if such a failure was attributed to them. The 
panel was fairly consistent in its timeline of occurrence, indicating that such an event had 
a 24% possibility of occurrence within two years and a probability of 47% in the next ten 
years.  The panel rated the overall impact of Ev-3 as high (7).  However, one of the 
panelists, a local politician, did not feel that the impact of Ev-3 would be quite as 
daunting.  His rationale was his understanding of technological advances and current 
efforts that would make communication failures less and less common.  He noted the 
initiatives at all levels of government to fund interoperability among municipalities to 
increase interagency communications.  He explained that the concept of radio 
interoperability would connect groups of police agencies together on one radio channel.  
This panelist scored the impact for this event very low, resulting in a lower average for 
the overall impact score. 
The fourth event (Ev-4) identified by the group was “an open border with 
Mexico.”  The panel was very diverse in its time measurement of when such an event 
would have an initial chance of occurrence.  From a high of ten years to a low of one 
year, the panel produced an average score of four years. The participants visualized Ev-4 
increasing to a probability of 13% in five years and 33% in ten years. The discussion 
from the group was centered on free trade, terrorism, and the need for California to 
maintain its migrant work force.  At the end of the conversation, the panel came to realize 
that the diversity in the numbers they assigned to this event was a direct result of 
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understanding that Ev-4 may be possible or impossible depending upon the political 
environment.  The panel had varying opinions of when this would happen based upon 
how they currently view the political landscape.  The impact assessment of Ev-4 by the 
group was low (+3).  This low impact assessment was the result of not knowing the 
circumstances by which the decision to open the border would be made.  In other words, 
the group would be inclined to raise their assessment of the impact of Ev-4 if it occurred 
as a result of a terrorist act or other incident related to public safety.  The group would 
lower its assessment score of Ev-4 if it occurred as a result of economics or politics. 
The fifth event (Ev-5) identified was “police officers forming a statewide union.” 
As the panel discussed this event, they displayed a great understanding of union issues 
and the impact police unions would have on the success or failure on the merger of police 
departments or services.  The panel pinpointed and explained one of the most difficult 
issues to resolve among so many unions. This was stated best by one of the police chief’s 
on the panel, “What is important to a member from one department may not be important 
to a member from a different department. Multiply this by the 400 or so municipal police 
unions in the state and such resolution or commonality to wants and desires become 
impossible.  The probability of so many police associations coming together is nil.”  As 
this was discussed, the panel found agreement on the idea that a singular police union 
would be very difficult to form, causing them to issue low scores of probability in each of 
the categories.  In fact, the group only identified an approximate 4% probability of Ev-5 
occurring within the next ten years.  This low probability of occurrence did not affect the 
group’s thinking of the impact of such an event if it did occur. The panel termed Ev-5 as 
one of those events having low probability but high impact. The participants established 
Ev-5 with having the highest possible impact score (+10). The group believed the coming 
together of all police officers in the state less than one union umbrella would significantly 
increase the opportunity to create a merger of police departments or even a single state 
police agency. 
3. Cross Impact Analysis  
Table 6 depicts the cross impact analysis of each event on each trend from the 
professional panel.  A discussion of the analysis is provided for the most significant 
impacts. The analysis includes Ev-1, Ev-2 and Ev-4. 
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Table 6. Cross Impact Analysis (Professional Panel) 
 Tr-1 Tr-2 Tr-3 Tr-4 Tr-5 
Ev-1 +5 +3 +4 +4 0 
Ev-2 +4 0 -4 0 0 
Ev-3 +2 -1 +2 0 0 
Ev-4 0 0 0 0 -5 
Ev-5 -2 0 0 -2 0 
Tr-1:  Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness and lower costs. 
Tr-2:  Liability exposure for law enforcement. 
Tr-3:  Desire to have local control of police. 
Tr-4:  Cost of police personnel. 
Tr-5:  Level of police service demands due to a more diverse citizenry. 
Ev-1:  A second large terrorist attack on the United States. 
Ev-2:  A catastrophic natural disaster. 
Ev-3:  A catastrophic communication failure between police departments. 
Ev-4:  An open border with Mexico. 
Ev-5:  Police officers forming a statewide union. 
 
a. Analysis of Event 1  
The occurrence of a second terrorist attack against the United States (Ev-
1) had the greatest impact on the most trends.  It is interesting to see that such a horrific, 
negative event may provide positive or good impact to most trends.  For example, 
resource sharing by cities occurred in New York after the attacks on the World Trade 
Center.  Municipal leaders all over the country shared personnel and equipment (Tr-1) in 
the rescue and recovery efforts after these terrorist attacks occurred.  Such an event 
galvanized city governments to share resources in order to enhance effectiveness and 
efficiency, along with the need to demonstrate empathy and patriotism for New Yorkers. 
This event was rated to have the highest and most positive impact (+5) on any of the 
trends. The panel felt that a second terrorist attack would increase the chances of 
thrusting police consolidation into the mainstream, making it an accepted practice to 
combat terrorism. 
A panel discussion of the liability exposure for law enforcement (Tr-2) 
had an interesting and positive outcome when measured against a second large terrorist 
attack (Ev-1).  The panel theorized a second attack would allow law enforcement even 
more latitude in the area of search and seizure, as the desire of achieving national security 
would be embraced by most of America.  The panelists believed the public, along with 
criminal justice system, would tolerate an increase in police powers to an even greater 
level.  While this author does not condone actions that reduce a person’s civil liberties, it 
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would be a grave oversight not to point out the increased public tolerance for police 
intrusiveness that has occurred in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, in exchange for 
greater security.  It may be that such a phenomenon translates into less liability exposure 
to law enforcement (Tr-2).  Participants stated the occurrence of Ev-1 would only 
increase the public’s tolerance, with inverse impacts to police agencies.   
The Professional Panel believed that Ev-1 might have a profound positive 
effect on the desire to give up local control of police departments (Tr-3).  The need to 
rally personnel resources, specialized expertise, and equipment in the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack may be the impetus to consolidate smaller police departments.  The 
pressure of providing citizens with proper police services may cause city leaders to 
change their stance on the issue of local control for the enhanced resources that would 
occur under a consolidation.  The desire to control or have control over one’s own police 
department might evaporate as the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few.   
A second terrorist attack (Ev-1) has the potential to drive down personnel 
cost (Tr-4).  It may be that such an attack is seen by Generation X and Y as a call to arms 
to join law enforcement in order to fight terrorism.  Much like the Great Generation 
flooded the armed services to participate in World War II, the nation’s youngest 
generations may see this as an opportunity to make their mark in history.  With a flooded 
police candidate market, the rule of supply and demand would allow police agencies to 
reduce benefit packages and salary, as the pool of candidates would be increased.  This 
would be possible as a candidate’s motivation for joining law enforcement would not 
come from salary, benefits, or retirement packages, but from something intangible:  
patriotism.     
b. Analysis of Event 2  
It was theorized that the occurrence of a catastrophic natural disaster (Ev-
2) might have significant positive effects that would increase resource sharing by cities to 
enhance effectiveness and lower cost (Tr-1).  In a natural disaster setting, local 
municipalities commonly assist each other to restore order and preserve human life.  
However, the effect of this event on this trend is a forced relationship as a result of a 
devastating incident and not seen as initiated for the perpetual good of law enforcement.   
 
 36 
Because this was seen as something that communities did not seek out on their own in 
order to survive, the sharing of such resources was seen as short-term with no lasting 
effect.   
Most citizens view the local police department as belonging to them.  It is 
possible that a desire to give up local control of a police department (Tr-3) would be 
negatively affected by a catastrophic natural disaster (Ev-2).  Such an event would have 
residents needing and wanting their local police departments more than ever and looking 
to this agency for leadership.  The panel felt citizens would not want to give this control 
up for the betterment of a regional effort. 
c. Analysis of Event 4   
According to the panelists, an open border with Mexico (Ev-4) would 
produce a powerful negative impact on the demands placed on law enforcement with an 
acute change in demographics (Tr-5).  It was theorized that many communities would 
increase their bi-lingual Mexican population and provide law enforcement officers with 
an overwhelming burden of language and cultural challenges that are already out of 
proportion today.  With a greater influx of Mexican citizens into the United States, local 
law enforcement would find itself in a precarious situation as the need for bi-lingual 
police officers would skyrocket, with recruitment and hiring of local bi-lingual cops 
unable to keep pace. Without the ability to properly communicate with citizens, daily 
operations of agencies would erode.   
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT PANEL RESULTS 
1. Trends 
The law enforcement panel identified twenty-five trends.  The panel ranked five 
of these as being the most significant.  These five trends are designated Tr-1 through Tr-5 
and are summarized in Table 7.  A synopsis of the panel discussion for each of the trends 
is provided below. 
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Table 7. Trends (Law Enforcement Panel) 
Trend (Tr) -5 years Today +5 years +10 years Concern Level 
(1-10) 
Tr-1 75 100 125 175 8 
Tr-2 50 100 125 250 5 
Tr-3 100 100 150 200 5 
Tr-4 100 100 150 175 10 
Tr-5 75 100 150 175 9 
Tr-1= Number of differing benefit packages among police departments. 
Tr-2= Number of oversight bodies governing police departments. 
Tr-3= Community expectations of police department services. 
Tr-4= Desire for politicians to have local control of police. 
Tr-5= The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments. 
The first trend (Tr-1) identified by the panel was the “number of differing benefit 
packages among police departments.” Most members of the panel believed that police 
officer benefits and salary packages were more closely matched from city to city five 
years ago, reflecting a score of 75, below the baseline of 100. The panel believed this 
trend would continue to increase, reaching 125 in five years and 175 in ten years, 
indicating police benefits becoming more diverse in the future. They explained that each 
police department appeared to have its own set of benefits and mechanisms to calculate 
fair salaries based upon the needs of the organization, resulting in an inconsistent set of 
salary levels and benefits within the police profession.  Two members of the panel 
projected that police benefits would be more homogenous in the future.  These panelists 
said the police industry is “coming together” through the sharing of contract strategies 
and collaborative surveys to gain equality in pay and benefits.  While the panel was split 
as to the direction of the trend, they agreed that combining police agencies would create 
the need to equalize salary and benefits for all those involved.  The panel forecasted that 
attempting to gain consensus from the police unions involved in a merger would be an 
impediment to merging.  It was the panel’s belief that police associations had the power 
to negatively impact or effectively nullify the formation of a merger via the negotiation 
process for salaries and benefits.  Thus, the level of concern was rated very high, with the 
average score established at 8.   
The second trend (Tr-2) identified by the panel was the “number of oversight 
bodies governing police departments.” The panel viewed this trend as increasing.  It was 
scored as a 50 five years ago, just half of the established baseline (100), and moving 
upward to 150 in five years and 250 in ten years.  The panel said that community policing 
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increased oversight of police departments by establishing citizen review boards and other 
community-based collaborations some ten years ago.  However, they identified Tr-2 to be 
increasing commensurate with the increasing in regional police initiatives they perceived.  
The panel reasoned the increased number of multi-agency task forces created over the 
past several years had increased the number of unique oversight bodies for these 
ventures. They recognized that such task forces have controlling bodies that are outside 
the norm.  One of the members identified a narcotics task force that was governed by the 
county’s police chief association, without official oversight from the parent agencies of 
the involved personnel.  Another member of the group participated in a local helicopter 
consortium made up of seven police departments.  This specialized air support unit was 
controlled by a board of directors (each city’s chief of police) and board of governors 
(each city’s manager). The panel believed these types of regionalized groups would 
continue to have non-traditional oversight, increasing Tr-2 over time. The participants 
viewed the level of concern for this trend to be moderate (5), as they did not believe this 
trend to have more than an average impact on the consolidation of police departments or 
service mergers. 
The third trend (Tr-3) that was identified by the panel was “community 
expectations of police department services.”  Each of the panel members, with the 
exception of one, said they believed expectations from community members would 
continue to increase as it relates to police services.  Most of the panelists told anecdotal 
stories of the changes they have seen in law enforcement regarding new programs, 
special projects, community initiatives and other increased services over the course of 
their careers.  On average, the panel’s scores revealed a belief that community service 
expectations would to increase from a baseline of 100, to 150 in five years and 200 in ten 
years. It was the consensus of the panel that police departments would continue to add 
innovative services to meet these expectations.  The panel rationalized that a police 
department that continually increased its services to meet the needs of its citizenry would 
increase the bonds it had with its community, making it more difficult for citizens and 
politicians to fathom altering its police department’s structure.  However, one panel 
member reminded the group that many police departments would not be able to meet the 
increased service demands of the future, creating a need to collaborate with other police 
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departments to increase capabilities.  After this discussion, the panel was split on the 
level of concern, resulting in a moderate score (5).   
The fourth trend (Tr-4) identified by the panel was “the desire for politicians to 
have local control of their police department.” The panelist agreed that city councils have 
always desired control over local police departments.  The group viewed this trend to be 
the same five years ago when compared to the baseline of today (100).  The participants 
were unanimous in their belief that the desire for local control would increase over time, 
thus, the group rated this trend to be increasing to 150 in five years and 175 in ten years. 
The panel agreed this trend would hamper the consolidation of police departments as a 
mainstream solution to fighting terrorism.  This trend garnered the highest concern level 
possible (10).  
The fifth trend (Tr-5) identified by the panel was the “number of multi-agency 
task forces formed by local police departments.”  During the discussion of Tr-2, this topic 
was discussed as it relates to police oversight. Two of the panel members had experience 
with these types of task forces, having been assigned to them for several years each.  
Thus, the group allowed these two individuals to tell of their experiences.  These panel 
members took turns explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each task force. For the 
most part, the comments were positive.  However, each agreed the crucial element for a 
successful multi-agency group was the operational leadership involved, along with proper 
support from the parent agency. After hearing from these two panelists, the participants 
viewed a rapid increase in this trend, doubling (200) in five years and tripling (300) in ten 
years. The panel explained that success in such task forces would lead to more, paving 
the way for the idea of merging police departments or services to fight terrorism.  This 
trend received the second highest level of concern (9).        
2. Events 
The law enforcement panel identified twenty-five events they felt would change 
the future and possibly lead to the development of consolidated police departments or 
increased service mergers. The panel ranked five of these as being the most significant.  
These five events are designated Ev-1 through Ev-5 and are summarized in Table 8.  A 
synopsis of the panel discussion surrounding each event is provided after the table. 
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Table 8. Events (Law Enforcement Panel) 
Event (Ev) Year(s) > 0 +5 years +10 years Impact –10 to +10 
Ev-1 1 19% 26% +7 
Ev-2 1 65% 62% +8 
Ev-3 3 26% 39% +5 
Ev-4 9 0% 10% -1 
Ev-5 1 75% 100% -9 
Ev-1=Second great depression. 
Ev-2=Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. 
Ev-3=Military attack on the United States. 
Ev-4=Legalization of all narcotics. 
Ev-5=Major police corruption scandal. 
The panel defined a second great depression (Ev-1) as an economic event capable 
of setting off a collapse of the country’s financial markets, resulting in a worldwide 
economic depression or severe recession. The participants believed this event would be 
possible within one year, increasing to a 19% probability in five years and 26% 
probability in ten years.  The panel was unanimous as it viewed Ev-1 as having a high 
impact (+7) on the formation of consolidated police departments or law enforcement 
services. As one of the members of the group stated, “If such an event happened, cities 
would have no recourse but to search for the most economic way to put cops on the 
street. Combining police forces would be inevitable under these circumstances.”  The 
negative socioeconomic impact of Ev-1 would turn into a positive catalyst, possibly 
initiating the merging police departments.  
The second event (Ev-2) was described as a major bio-terrorism attack on the 
United States.  The panel explained this event to be the release of a biological element in 
a highly populated urban area, resulting in thousands of casualties.  The group believed 
this event to be possible within one year and described its probability of occurrence to be 
65% in five years, but decreasing to 62% in ten years. The panel stated that technology, 
increased security measures, and the investment of greater intelligence collection would 
decrease the probability of occurrence over time. During the discussion, two panel 
members explained how this event would negatively impact the idea of merging police 
organizations. They said the event would create an extended time period of chaos, 
requiring police officers to be on the street a greater number of hours, even in cities 
where the attack did not occur. They argued that this would reinforce the idea of local 
control to city leaders who would want to keep police resources “home,” instead of 
honoring the agreed-upon mutual aid requirements.  In fact, one of the panelists theorized 
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that some politicians may want the local police department to void mutual aid pacts as a 
method to make sure police resources remain under local control.  The other four panel 
members disagreed with this point of view.  They stated Ev-2 would kill many local first 
responders from a number of municipalities, creating a public safety void.  The group 
believed impacted communities would band together through some sort of formal 
agreement to merge police forces on a limited basis and for a set time period.  These 
panel members argued that this would positively impact the creation of merged police 
services.  After the discussion ended, the group unanimously voted for Ev-2 to be a 
positive occurrence in relation to the issue being studied, rating the second highest impact 
score (+8) in relation to the other events. 
The third event (Ev-3) identified by the panel was some sort of military attack on 
the United States. The participants described this as a non-terrorist attack in nature, 
stating the enemy would be another country, possibly an emerging superpower. Each of 
the panel members viewed this event as having an increasing level of probability with the 
first year of occurrence in three years. The panelists viewed the probability to be 26% in 
five years and 39% in ten years.  Two of the panelists with military experience rated the 
ten-year probability much higher than the established average.  These panel members 
believed the war in Afghanistan and Iraqi had reduced military resources, leaving the 
United States vulnerable to attack from another nation.  They forecasted this would be a 
war of natural resources, as water, oil, and other necessities are becoming scarce. Even 
though the panel was split on the timeline and probabilities, they unanimously believed it 
would be a moderate (+5) positive impact on the ideas of consolidation police agencies.    
The majority of the panel believed the outbreak of war would unite communities 
and increase the desire and need to share resources on an unprecedented level. Such 
sharing would create a climate conducive to eventually merging police departments.  The 
panel did not view this type of event as causing a great impact to the issue being 
discussed, as it did for Ev-2.  The panel discussed this and rationalized that the attack on 
the United States would be entirely handled by the military, while Ev-2 would be a local 
incident, for locals to solve. 
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The fourth event (Ev-4) identified by the panel was the legalization of narcotics.  
Ev-4 was described to be a sweeping legislative event, allowing for all drugs to be 
legalized.  While one panel member did not believe this event could be linked to the 
matter being studied, another panelist linked E-4 as it relates to funding the war on 
terrorism.  This panelist said the war on terrorism would become so costly Americans 
would demand an end to the war on drugs, allowing the federal government to regulate 
and tax these newly legalized products to finance fighting terrorism.  After this discussion 
the participants identified the first possibility of occurrence to be in nine years, making 
the probability 0% in five years.  The panel believed the probability would increase to 
10% in ten years.  This event was rated as having a slight negative impact (-1) on the 
issue being reviewed, as legalizing all  narcotics would eliminate the need for police 
departments to coordinate the many drug task forces that currently exist.  This would 
reduce multi-jurisdictional collaboration, and thus reduce the “stepping stones” to 
consolidation. 
The fifth event (Ev-5) identified by the panel was a major police corruption 
scandal.  The panelists defined this event to be a criminal incident, identifying police 
officers as suspects from a large metropolitan police department. The panel identified the 
first possibility of occurrence to be in one year, with an 81% probability of occurrence in 
five years and a 90% probability of occurrence in ten years. Most of the panel believed 
the event would have a negative impact on the issue being studied.  The majority 
explained that Ev-5 had the potential of influencing the opinion of citizens and politicians 
that a large police department would be difficult to manage and hold accountable, 
exposing city leaders to greater liability. Thus, combining smaller police agencies to form 
one larger police department in order to fight terrorism would not be an appealing model 
to follow.  The panel impact rating for this event was the highest (-9). 
3. Cross Impact Analysis  
Table 9 depicts the cross impact analysis of each event on each trend from the law 
enforcement panel.  A narrative analysis of the panel’s discussion is provided for the 




Table 9. Cross Impact Analysis (Law Enforcement Panel) 
 Tr-1 Tr-2 Tr-3 Tr-4 Tr-5 
Ev-1 +7 0 +7 +7 -5 
Ev-2 0 0 -3 -3 0 
Ev-3 0 0 +3 +1 0 
Ev-4 0 0 0 0 0 
Ev-5 -1 -5 -7 -8 -2 
Tr-1= Number of differing benefit packages among police departments. 
Tr-2= The number of community oversight bodies governing police departments. 
Tr-3= Community expectations of police department services. 
Tr-4= Desire for politicians to have local control of police. 
Tr-5= The number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments. 
Ev-1=Second great depression. 
Ev-2=Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. 
Ev-3=Military attack on the United States.   
Ev-4=Legalization of all narcotics. 
Ev-5=Major police corruption scandal.  
a. Analysis of Event 1 
The panel believed the occurrence of a second great depression (Ev-1) 
would cause an immediate decrease in municipal tax revenues, reducing the number of 
varied benefit packages among police departments (Tr-1).  An economic collapse would 
hamper or completely eliminate a city’s ability to pay for its police department. Under 
these circumstances, some cities would seek partners to share law enforcement costs. The 
panel forecasted that Ev-1 would have a positive impact on slowing or completely 
reversing the trend of increasing benefit packages among police departments (Tr-1).  The 
group theorized that cities would find themselves in a strong bargaining position to revise 
police contracts, reducing salary and benefits into simple terms, creating a more 
homogenous benefit package in the law enforcement profession. The panel of participants 
believed it would be fundamentally easier to create a police merger with salary and 
benefit offerings similar rather than varied.  For this reason, the panel scored the impact 
of Ev-1 on Tr-1 very high (+7).   
As cities attempted to reduce police costs at a result of Ev-1, the panel 
believed the community’s expectations for police services (Tr-3) would decline. The 
panel explained that citizens and political leaders alike would be cognizant of the 
economic challenges facing the city, lowering their service expectations. The panel 
discussed the reluctance of most communities to create new taxes to fund or maintain city 
services.  The panels discussed the numerous ballot measures that have been defeated 
over the past ten years in local and state elections that attempted to tax citizens more in 
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order to pay for normal services provided by local governments.  The panel was 
unanimous that Ev-1 would have a “good” or positive impact on the creation of 
consolidated police departments or merged police services and issued it a high score (+7) 
as it related to Tr-3.  
In the face of an economic depression (Ev-1), panel participants believed 
politicians would have a reduced desire to maintain control of the local police department 
(Tr-4). The panel discussed local control and believed joining forces with another police 
agency would be a way to retain some sort of control during tough economic times, as the 
alternative would be to contract with the county sheriff’s department, transferring control 
to county politicians.  The discussion regarding local control concluded with the panel 
unanimously theorizing politicians wanted to control police departments, not citizens.  
The panel stated that citizens were interested in the most effective and efficient means to 
have the best possible police force, while politicians were looking for a means to garner 
votes for the next election.  The panel believed politicians sought to use police agencies 
to further their own political ambitions.  The panel scored Ev-1 to have a high impact on 
Tr-4 (+7).  
Last, the panel considered the impact of a great economic depression (Ev-
1) on the number of multi-agency task forces formed by local police departments (Tr-5). 
Most of the panel members believed municipal police departments would remove their 
personnel from these work groups as such an economic event would most likely force 
cities to lay off police officers in order to reduce costs, forcing personnel assigned to task 
forces to return to their parent agency to fill assignment gaps. With a decrease in the 
number of multi-jurisdictional teams, cooperation and collaborative efforts between cities 
would be reduced.  The panel identified this as having a negative impact on the effort to 
initiate consolidated police agencies or merge police services.  This impact was reflected 
with a negative score (-5).  
b. Analysis of Event 5 
The panel of participants believed a major police corruption scandal (Ev-
5) would increase the number of community oversight bodies governing police 
departments (Tr-2).  Two panel members took turns talking about the changes that took 
place in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) after the beating of Rodney King.  
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They surmised the excessive force scandal created the demand by Los Angeles politicians 
and citizens for greater oversight of the police. The participants explained how increased 
review boards were formed, along with more community involvement and increased 
powers to the Los Angeles Police Commission.  From this example, the panel determined 
that Ev-5 would increase Tr-2 and create an atmosphere of distrust between 
politicians/citizens and police.  This would translate into a greater desire for increased 
review of the local police, not decreasing the chances of acceptance for small police 
departments to be turned into large police departments through consolidation. The panel 
scored the affect of Ev-5 on Tr-2 to be negative (-5), restricting the notion police 
consolidation. 
When the panelists discussed the impact of Ev-5 on Tr-3 (citizen 
expectations of police services), they concluded that these expectations would decrease in 
the face of a major police corruption scandal as citizens would begin to question or lose 
confidence in their local police force.  The panel perceived all police departments to be 
impacted by such a large scandal, as the public would identify all police officers as 
possibly being corrupt. As this occurred, the panel decided that citizens would not want 
to have a police force that was larger and seemingly less likely to be accountable for their 
actions.  The panel believed the affect of Ev-5 on Tr-3 would result in a “bad” or negative 
impact on the restructuring of police services into some sort of consolidated model. This 
belief was represented with a score of -7. 
Last, the participants considered the effect of Ev-5 on Tr-4 (the desire for 
politicians to have local control of police).  When this impact was discussed, the panel 
talked about the LAPD Rampart scandal as they considered it very close to depicting Ev-
5.  The panel identified some of the issues that were revealed within this LAPD 
investigation.  One of the panelists recalled a debriefing he attended given by then-Police 
Chief Bernard Parks.  This panel member told the group that one of the major issues in 
the Rampart investigation was a lack of supervision and accountability within the 
Rampart Division. The entire panel discussed this issue and decided local politicians 
would want to clamp down on their police departments to make sure such a scandal did 
not occur “on their watch.”  The panel believed Ev-5 would increase a politician’s desire  
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for local control of police, thereby reducing the likelihood of increasing the size of 
agencies through consolidation.  The group of panelists provided a high negative score of 
Ev-5’s effect on Tr-4 (-8).    
D. AREAS OF CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PANELS 
It is important to identify the areas of congruence between the professional and 
law enforcement panels. These areas signify important issues, positive or negative, 
relating to the consolidation of police agencies or merging of police services. As the 
groups involved were diverse in background and each member incorporated dissimilar 
perspectives, congruent issues between the panels were considered the most significant to 
the thesis research. With the assumption that diverse panels would identify different 
problems and construct varied solutions to an issue, the intersected ideas and issues of 
these two panels were deemed to be valid and relevant. Thus, the areas of congruence 
were considered as the most critical pieces of information.  
For each panel, a complete list of trends and events has been constructed in a side-
by-side configuration in order to easily compare and contrast their similarities and 
dissimilarities. They have been color-coded for easy identification.  Trends and/or events 
from one panel that match those of another panel have the same color markings. Overall, 
there are four areas of similarity between the panels.  Table 10 summarizes the findings. 













Resource sharing by 
cities to enhance 
effectiveness and lower 
costs. 
Tr-1:  
The number of 
differing benefit 
packages among police 
departments. 
Ev-1:  
A second large terrorist 
attack on the United 
States. 
Ev-1:  
A Second great 
depression. 
Tr-2:  
Liability exposure for 
law enforcement. 
Tr-2:  
The number of 
community oversight 
bodies governing police 
departments. 
Ev-2:  




A Bio-terrorism attack 
on the United States. 
Tr-3:  
The desire to have local 












A Military attack on the 
United States.   
Tr-4:  
The cost of police 
personnel. 
Tr-4:  
The desire for 
politicians to have local 
Ev-4:  
An open border with 
Mexico. 
Ev-4:  
The legalization of all 
narcotics. 
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control of police.   
Tr-5:  
The level of police 
service demands due to 
a more diverse 
citizenry. 
Tr-5:  
The number of multi-
agency task forces 
formed by local police 
departments. 
Ev-5:  
Police officers forming 
a statewide union. 
Ev-5:  
A major police 
corruption scandal. 
Between the two panels, three of five, or 60% of the trends were similar.  The 
professional panel’s Tr-1 matched the law enforcement panel’s Tr-5. These two trends 
identified increased resource sharing and the formation of multi-agency police teams 
among local cops.  The analysis of these trends was the same by each panel.  They 
projected the trends to have a positive or “good” impact in the development of 
consolidated police departments or services in the future.  The professional panel’s Tr-3 
matched the law enforcement panel’s Tr-4, as both considered the issue of local control.  
However, the professional group clearly identified the impetus for local control to be 
citizens and the law enforcement group stated the push would be from politicians. The 
groups were united, however, in the belief that local control would be the most 
challenging issue facing police consolidation and the most difficult to overcome. Last, the 
professional panel’s Tr-5 was closely related to the law enforcement panel’s Tr-3.  Each 
of these trends dealt with police service demands or expectations.  The groups agreed that 
these trends had both positive and negative connotations to police consolidation.        
When considering events, the similarities between panels totaled only one of five, 
or 20%.  The professional panel’s Ev-1 was the single match to Ev-2 from the law 
enforcement panel. However, the panels produced different results from these events.  
The professional panel’s Ev-1 had a high, positive impact on the group’s trends and aided 
in the formation of a new police model, while the law enforcement panel’s Ev-2 had little 
or no impact on the group’s trends and was insignificant to forming a consolidated police 
agency. The different findings on the same event may be attributed to the cross impact 
analysis, as the trends for each were dissimilar, producing alternate outcomes.  Also, as 
this analysis is based upon the group’s perspective differences were anticipated.  
At the end of the panel discussions, each of the members was asked if a 
consolidated police force would be an effective way to approach the future of policing in 
order to provide greater protection from terrorism.  The members of each panel,  
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professional and law enforcement, agreed that such a police model would be effective, 
but not politically practical.  Their views diverged when explaining how consolidation 
may occur.   
The professional panel believed that it would take a great deal of time and 
influence to make consolidating police departments a mainstream solution to fighting 
terrorism.  This panel discussed the possibilities of a large police consolidation and the 
specific types of positive impact such a police model would bring to Los Angeles County 
and its capabilities relating to counter-terrorism.  The panel predicted a slow migration 
toward this type of police model.  They believed resource sharing would increase over 
time, along with the formation of more and more regional teams that achieved successful 
results.  The panel stated the ultimate requirement would be political sponsorship and the 
need to save money.    
The law enforcement panel discussed the impact of citizen groups and the 
pressure applied to local politicians, as they described how a merger of police 
departments or the consolidation of services would occur in the future.  These panel 
members agreed with the professional panel as to the many benefits this new police 
model would generate in Los Angeles County, stretching counter-terrorism capabilities 
across a broader populous, ultimately benefiting more people.  However, they were not 
optimistic that politicians would quietly remove themselves from controlling their police 
agencies.  The law enforcement panel believed consolidation would occur as a matter of 
economic need and be spurred by citizens unwilling to pay more taxes to support the 
local law enforcement entity.    
E. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE OUTCOMES 
Ultimately, the NGT exercise was used to identify issues and/or challenges 
relating to the subject being studied in order to assist in the identification of solutions. 
Scenarios were constructed from the NGT in order to provide greater clarity to the 
possible futures that these events and trends may create.  From a basic scenario, three 
outcomes have been depicted to focus the subject matter.  The three outcomes create 
futures that are normative, pessimistic, and optimistic. Each of the outcomes is derived 
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from the same initial scenario.  The process of scenario development has been utilized in 
the past and deemed valuable when attempting to devise homeland security strategies.69  
1. Scenario Background 
The cities of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena are nestled against the foothills in 
northern Los Angeles County.  They are situated in linear fashion, each with a portion of 
its boundary adjacent to the city of Los Angeles.  The cities span seventy-two square 
miles, with a combined population of approximately 500,000.    
It is the fourteenth anniversary of the most devastating terrorist attacks in United 
States history. The assault killed thousands of innocent victims and ended the safety and 
security that Americans took for granted, changing the world forever.  As the twin towers 
collapsed and the Pentagon proved vulnerable, this altered world was symbolized by the 
passengers of United Airlines Flight 93 who battled hijackers and purposely downed their 
airliner in a Pennsylvania field to avoid additional devastation on the ground.    
During the years following the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States went to war, destroying the Taliban government in Afghanistan, along with 
terrorist camps in the Philippines and Korea.  President George W. Bush took exhaustive 
measures to topple Saddam Hussein’s government, ending with this tyrant’s execution.  
With an American military base established near Baghdad, a United States-led coalition 
invaded Iran with an overwhelming military force, reducing Iranian nuclear facilities to 
rubble. For over a decade, the United States government used preemptive military strikes 
against terrorists living in foreign countries, while increasing security measures in the 
homeland.  The government unraveled a number of threats and plots that included an 
assortment of attacks that promised death and destruction to all Americans.   
The American public grew weary of terrorism, taxes, and the security 
“enhancements” that inconvenienced even a trip to the grocery store.  As a result, most 
longed for the days of a bustling economy, and an end to the daily terror warnings from 
the Department of Homeland Security.  With no other terrorist attacks occurring on 
American soil, the public became desensitized to the possibility of another occurrence. 
                                                 
69 Gilmore Commission Report, Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland 
Preserving Our Security, Vol. V (Arlington: RAND, December 15, 2003), 11-21. 
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This sentiment influenced local police departments to reduce or eliminate their focus on 
terrorism, causing deterioration to overall counter-terrorism capabilities to a pre-9/11 
disposition.   
2. Scenario 
It is September 11, 2015.  It is a hot, muggy day in the Los Angeles basin.  At 
7:00 a.m., the city-bound commuters on the Interstate 10 and 5 freeways are using their 
air conditioners to soothe the sun’s pounding rays.  Already, it is eighty-five degrees with 
thermometers expected to reach triple digits by the lunch hour.  Traffic is snarled and the 
occupants of each car tune to their favorite radio station, listening to the latest news.  A 
large yellow Ryder rental truck eases off the freeway and maneuvers through the 
downtown area of Burbank.  The truck parks in front of an elementary school where 700 
students will soon gather as they prepare to enter classrooms to begin the day.  Two 
young men wait inside the cab of the truck nervous that they will be detected; each looks 
from side to side in an effort to locate any passersby.  The men are somber, serious, and 
dedicated to their mission.  They have waited patiently for nearly fifteen years, planning 
with precision and willing to die for the cause. 
In the cities of Glendale and Pasadena, the same plot is unfolding.  Young men 
working in pairs, driving large trucks containing tons of explosives are positioning 
themselves in public areas where children are present.  In Pasadena, one of the men 
reflects on the strategy to attack targets in these small communities.  He recalls being told 
by fellow believers that local police are incapable of stopping them and the killing of 
American children is necessary to support the war against the infidels.  He is certain the 
plan will be a success.   
a. Normative Outcome  
At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place.  With great precision, cellular 
telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams.  The orders 
are given to detonate after assuring each team leader God is pleased with their mission.  
Trucks explode in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena, tearing through adjacent buildings 
and killing most of the occupants.  In total, these attacks kill over 1,500 Americans in 
three cities.  As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly all are under the age of 
fifteen.  
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During the initial hours, and extending to many days and weeks following 
this multi-city terrorist attack, affected municipalities call upon mutual aid agreements to 
share police services in an extensive fashion. The response and cooperativeness of the 
involved cities are both courageous and generous, but uncoordinated and slow.  Cities 
lack the ability to communicate with each other as radio systems are dissimilar and 
fragmented. 
While law enforcement responds to the disaster, resources are lacking in 
relationship to the need. Regular patrol officers and detective personnel are pooled 
together to perform their respective duties.  Mutual aid officers are used to provide the 
basic law enforcement functions, as the local officers are needed for rescue and recovery 
efforts.  Detective personnel are utilized to provide follow up investigations to ensure 
those cases that concerned threats of public safety are adequately brought to completion, 
while all other cases are filed for completion at a later date. Special Weapons and Tactics 
Teams (SWAT) are consolidated and used as regional response teams as fears of 
additional attacks are reported to be imminent.  Police officers with canines are reduced 
in number and sent to locations that require more rescue personnel.  The remaining 
canine teams are consolidated in order to cover requests that involve the use of police 
dogs throughout the impacted tri-city area.  Helicopter patrols are merged together, flying 
singular patrols for all three cities, providing greater police presence and a possible 
deterrent to further attacks. 
The city councils of the three besieged cities release local control of their 
police departments for the time being and allow a complete sharing of resources to cope 
with the disaster at hand.  The politicians view this occurrence as an attack on the United 
States, and not an attack on the individual cities.  Thus, the leadership is united to fight 
against a mutual enemy and trust one another to share each other’s resources.  Territorial 
boundaries and any local squabbles that exist are wiped out in the name of patriotism. 
Within six months of this terrible disaster, each municipality returns its 
resources and begins assessing the hometown’s need.  Cooperation among the three cities 
and those throughout the valley exists, but the ad-hoc configuration of police services that 
was put into place to respond to the disaster dissolves, returning to business as usual. 
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b. Pessimistic Outcome 
At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place.  With great precision, cellular 
telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams.  The orders 
are given to detonate after assuring each team leader God is pleased with their mission.  
Trucks explode in Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena, tearing through adjacent buildings 
and killing most of the occupants.  In total, these attacks kill over 2,500 Americans in 
three cities.  As the victims are identified, it is found that nearly all are under the age of 
fifteen.  
Each of the cities is in chaos.  There are not enough police resources to 
properly respond to such an incident and mutual aid agreements are not in place.  Nearly 
eight years ago, the desire for local control of police departments from community 
members and powerful politicians caused area police chiefs to withdraw from any 
agreement that did not allow direct control of police resources to come from within their 
own departments.  With this structure, any type of effective mutual response to such a 
terrorist attack was found to be impossible.  As a result, it is estimated that an additional 
1,000 lives were lost when emergency personnel responded and lacked proper training, 
equipment, communications, and the ability to call upon neighboring municipalities for 
assistance.   
In the weeks, months, and years that followed this horrific event, criticism 
of law enforcement’s response to this attack was fast and furious.  Community leaders 
spoke out against the police department’s leadership and each of the police departments 
was blamed for the loss of life that many considered a result of the slow and inadequate 
response to each of the scenes, along with the failure to possess a vision of the future and 
need to possess cooperative agreements with other cities.  Many of the police officers in 
each of the agencies experienced a loss of morale and along with posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).  A high number of officers retired from law enforcement due to 
psychological problems associated with the terrorist attack while others opted to “lateral” 
to other police agencies outside of the three cities. 
Like a group of dominoes falling, the exiting police personnel created 
historically high rates of vacancies.  Most of the three police departments attempted to 
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recruit new hires with bonuses, better retirement, lifetime medical, and other costly 
incentives that doubled expenditures for personnel when compared to the benefit 
packages before the attacks on the cities.  The gap between increasing personnel costs 
and decreasing opportunities for each of the cities to generate revenue in the era of 
terrorism was continuing to expand with no easy solution identified. 
c. Optimistic Outcome 
At 7:35 a.m., all of the trucks are in place.  With great precision, cellular 
telephone calls are made from a central location to all of the terrorist teams.  The orders 
are given to detonate after assuring each team leader that God is pleased with their 
mission.  Each of the teams’ attempts to detonate their bombs, but nothing happens.  
Meanwhile, the Anti-Terrorist Section (ATS) of the Tri-Cities Police 
Authority has three surveillance units in place to watch each of the terrorists’ trucks 
carefully, while members of SWAT are deployed at each of the locations in case an 
immediate assault is necessary. The ATS command intercepts and listens to the incoming 
cellular telephone calls that order the terrorists to carry out their plans.  As the orders 
come to the terrorists telephonically, the ATS leadership instructs the SWAT officers to 
arrest the occupants of the trucks.  The tactical teams swarm the trucks, removing the 
terrorists and placing them under arrest.   
The ATS infiltrated the terrorist cell nearly two years ago, managing to 
identify the locations where their explosives would be purchased.  The ATS arranged for 
each of the sales to the terrorists to be non-explosive material that would cause no public 
safety hazard.  The public and the police officers making the arrest were never in danger. 
The Tri-Cities Police Authority was formed in 2006 after the terrorists 
destroyed the World Trade Center and several successful regional programs proved the 
idea of police consolidation worthy of a try.  Within this small suburban area, the police 
departments of Burbank, Glendale, and Pasadena created a regional atmosphere of 
sharing resources by introducing new programs in small increments.  Beginning in 1998, 
the police departments funded helicopter patrols of all their cities; set up a single SWAT 
team; and a three-city canine unit.  All of these programs allowed a significant number of  
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personnel resources to transfer from their old assignments to other areas that required 
more personnel, including seven police officers, one sergeant and one lieutenant to a tri-
city Anti Terrorist Section. 
With great success in these regional programs, the three police 
departments began theorizing a merger.  With two of the three police chiefs available for 
retirement in 2003, a plan was put forward to study the issue of consolidation and make 
recommendations.  In 2006, a plan was initiated and the Tri-Cities Police Authority was 
born.  This new department was under the leadership of one police chief and a police 
Board of Governors that represented each of the cities equally. Additionally, a citizen 
review commission was formed to ensure each of the three communities was represented, 
providing input to police programs, policies, and other important issues. 
While this material is subjective and not scientific, it lends clarity to many 
of the issues possibly facing law enforcement in the years to come.  Because both panels 
identified the issue of local control to be the most daunting to the creation of a more 
centralized police model, it seems appropriate to provide greater insight into this issue.  
Therefore, the next chapter is dedicated to the issues surrounding local control and 
analyzing this important aspect of the research being conducted. 
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IV. LOCAL CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of residents and elected officials to incorporate values into the local 
policing approach in resolving local community problems was embedded into American 
government by the signers of the constitution.70  The American political idea has always 
been to restrict, as far as possible, the power of the government.71  This is underscored in 
the constitutional axioms that created the separation of church and state, checks and 
balances, and states’ rights. It is with these restrictions the American public binds those 
who are trusted with power, holding them accountable for their actions. While local 
control theoretically establishes greater accountability, making government employees 
and politicians directly answerable to their communities,72 there appears to be an 
assumption that a municipality’s residents and local politicians are inflexible on the issue, 
viewing it as an absolute requirement for the structuring of a responsible police 
department.   
The greatest impediment to police consolidation or the merging of police services 
is the perceptual or actual reduction of local control by citizens and politicians over their 
police department. For neighborhood residents and elected officials, police consolidation 
creates the fear that services will be reduced, responsiveness will be decreased, and their 
ability to direct local police resources will be undermined. This issue received great 
attention in much of the literature concerning police department mergers and/or service 
consolidations.  Additionally, the NGT process confirmed what the literature asserted as 
both interview panels identified an increasing desire for citizens and politicians to have 
ultimate control over local police resources.  With local control as the most probable 
                                                 
70 O. Elmer Polk and David W. MacKenna, “Dilemmas of the New Millennium: Policing in the 21st 
Century,” Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Vol. XXX, Issue 3 (September/October 2005): 1-6. 
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Modern Policing Structures.” History of Crime, Policing, and Punishment Conference, Canberra, Australia, 
(December 9-10, 1999) available at  http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/hcpp/edwards.pdf, accessed on 
August 5, 2005. 
72 Ibid. 
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obstacle to the implementation of merging police departments to fight terrorism, the 
subject requires and deserves further scrutiny. 
B. THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT 
In 1972, the Kansas City Police Department initiated a study to analyze routine 
preventive patrol and its impact on crime and the community. This landmark study was 
conducted for twelve consecutive months, ending in October of 1973. During the 
experiment, routine preventive patrols in fifteen police beats were varied.  For beats one 
through five, preventive patrol was eliminated, and police officers were directed to 
merely react to calls for service, disallowing proactive action by the assigned personnel. 
In beats six through ten, routine patrol procedures were maintained, allowing police 
officers to respond to calls for service and take preventive action as desired.  These beats 
were used as the control measurement for the experiment. For the last five beats, eleven 
through fifteen, preventive patrols were intensified by two or three times the norm.73  The 
experiment asked the following questions: 
• Would citizens notice changes in the level of police patrol? 
• Would different levels of visible police patrol affect recorded crime or the 
outcome of victim surveys? 
• Would citizen fear of crime and attendant behavior change as a result of 
differing patrol levels? 
• Would citizen degree of satisfaction with police change?74 
• The findings from this experiment provided credible data that concluded the 
following:  
• Citizens did not notice the difference when the level of patrol was changed or 
services were altered. 
• The increases and decreases in the level of patrol had no significant effect on 
specific crimes. 
• The rate at which crimes were reported did not differ across the fifteen beats. 
• Citizen fear of crime was unchanged. 
• Citizen satisfaction with police services was without noticeable difference 
among the different beats.75   
                                                 
73 George L. Kelling, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman and Charles E. Brown, “The Kansas City 
Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report,” (Washington D.C.: Police Foundation, 1974), 7.  
74 Ibid., 16-34. 
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While the Kansas City study does not negate the issue of local control, it causes 
considerable doubt that citizens would notice the changes that would occur in the 
operational levels of its police department in the areas of service delivery, patrol 
deployment, and response times under a police consolidation or police services merger.  
The study indicates that a citizen’s fear of crime and feeling of safety will not be altered 
if police services are reconfigured.  The experiment suggests that local control of police 
departments may not be as necessary as critics of police consolidation claim.  If local 
control is tantamount to citizens and politicians, how come they were unable to detect a 
change in the services received over the course of twelve months?  Perhaps the 
perception of control is more important than actual control.  If this supposition is true, 
merging police agencies or services in order to fight terrorism may be an acceptable 
mainstream idea that deserves serious consideration and public discussion.   
C. CITIZEN SURVEYS AFTER CONSOLIDATION  
To date, there have been no police consolidations that were reversed once put into 
place.76  This is not evidence of police mergers being more efficient or effective in the 
war on terrorism, but it does emphasize the degree to which local citizens and elected 
officials have accepted or been pleased with benefits derived from altering the structure 
of policing, diminishing the theory that citizens and politicians would demand complete 
and ultimate control of police. For communities who have either combined police 
departments or merged their police services, the evidence of success or acceptance of a 
new police model may be found in the level of citizen satisfaction. 
For the city-county consolidations of Miami-Dade, Nashville-Davidson, 
Jacksonville-Duval, Indianapolis-Marion, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Lexington-Fayette, 
and Louisville-Jefferson, there is evidence that citizens continue to endorse the structure 
of merged government, including police services. Table 11 summarizes these mergers 
and the level of citizen support that exists for them. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Kelling et al., “Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment,” 7. 
76 San Francisco Grand Jury Report, “Sheriff/Police Department Merger,” (1999-2000) available at 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3753, accessed on August 2, 2005. 
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Table 11. Citizen Satisfaction Surveys77 






Miami-Dade (FL) 1957 2,253,362 No vote Popular 
Nashville-
Davidson (TE) 
1962 569,891 57% 72% 
Jacksonville-Duval 
(FL) 
1967 778,879 64% 68%(10-yr. resident) 
83% (new resident) 
Indianapolis-
Marion (IN) 
1969 860,454 No vote Not popular 
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg (SC) 
1971 700,000 No vote Popular 
Lexington-Fayette 
(KY) 
1972 260,512 67% No survey 
Louisville-
Jefferson (KY) 
2003 693,604 54% No survey 
There was no initial vote taken to approve the merging of services between the 
city of Miami and county of Dade (Florida) in 1957.  Thus, there is no measurement level 
of citizen approval at onset of this consolidation.  However, in a study assessing the 
merged city and county twenty years later, citizens identified the consolidated 
government and the services received as “popular.”78 When the City of Nashville and 
Davidson County (Tennessee) merged, 57% of the voters approved the action.  Ten years 
later, in 1977, a poll revealed that the consolidation increased in popularity to 72%.79 
Similarly, the union between the City of Jacksonville and Duval County (Florida) 
increased in citizen popularity over time.  This consolidation received 64% backing at the 
polls when it was initiated, and 68% support in a survey conducted ten years later. For 
residents living in this area less than ten-years, the percentage jumped to an 83% 
approval rating.80  The consolidation between the City of Indianapolis and Marion 
County (Indiana) was not taken to the ballot when it was conceived.  However, in a 
survey conducted in 1993, the majority of citizens surveyed were “dissatisfied” with the 
services provided from the merged governments.81 In the City of Charlotte and 
Mecklenburg County (South Carolina) no vote was taken by citizens, as these two entities 
                                                 
77 Sammis White, “Cooperation not Consolidation: The Answer for Milwaukee Governance,” 
Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Report, vol. 15, no. 8 (November 2002): 5-13. 
78 Ibid., 12. 
79 Ibid., 6. 
80 Ibid., 7. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
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did not consolidate organizations, but merged services through a number of contracts.  
According to internal polls initiated by city officials, the joint service agreements are 
“popular” with citizens.82  For the City of Lexington and Fayette County, 67% of voters 
approved the merger when it was forged.  Since this city-county merger, there have not 
been any surveys to measure citizen support.83 The City of Louisville and Jefferson 
County were merged in 2003 with 57% voter approval.84  This merger is relatively new 
and no post-consolidation surveys have been completed.  
The survey results and/or initial level of support from voters in favor of 
consolidation demonstrate a high level of citizen acceptance over a broad based 
population from different regions of the country.  While these surveys do not disprove the 
desire, need, or a community’s right to have local control of police, the surveys provide 
evidence that merged police departments or consolidated services may be created with a 
reduced level of local control that is acceptable to a large majority of citizens.  For police 
leaders and local politicians to reject the idea of consolidating police on the assumption 
their constituency will not want, or accept consolidation is contrary to the findings of the 
surveys summarized in Table 11.  An example of such an assumption was documented in 
the professional panel’s NGT process summarized in Chapter III, as one of the 
participants (a local elected official) stated constituents would never allow politicians to 
consolidate police departments.  He reasoned citizens would not want control of the 
police department to be given to a broader group of decision makers.  This local official 
was positive his supporters would not want a merged police force.  However, he admitted 
he was making a presumption without really knowing.  
D. CREATING LOCAL CONTROL IN A CONSOLIDATED STRUCTURE  
As the IACP describes police consolidation as a matter of degree,85 perhaps local 
control should be considered in the same manner.  One community may tolerate more or 
less control of its police force than other communities.  If police consolidation is deemed 
                                                 
82 White, “Cooperation not Consolidation,” 13. 
83 Ibid., 9. 
84 Ibid., 10. 
85 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Consolidating.” 
 60 
a better means to provide greater homeland defense and security, consideration to 
different levels of local control may be appropriate.   
A model to establish local control in a consolidated police structure should be 
layered, allowing different communities to increase or decrease the level of control they 
desire by simply adding or removing different elements.  This may be accomplished in a 
format that includes politicians, citizens, and police officials.  The duties and 
responsibilities, along with the term served on the commission or board would be 
different for each consolidation. The following is a sample of some of these layers: 
• Police Commission: A commission composed of an equal number of elected 
officials from each of the cities involved with the police consolidation.    
• Board of Governors: A board consisting of each City Manager, or Mayor, 
representing each of the cities involved with the police consolidation. 
• Citizen Review Board: A board consisting of several citizens from each of the 
cities involved with the police consolidation, appointed in equal number by 
the Police Commission, Board of Governors, and Chief of Police.  
• Executive Board: A board consisting of the police chiefs from each of the 
cities involved with a services merger. 
 The next chapter is a case study on the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST), a 
merged air support police service in Los Angeles County.  FAST is a model to increase 
counter terrorism capabilities across a broader spectrum.   
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V. A MODEL TO INCREASE CAPABILITIES:  F.A.S.T. 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Pasadena Police Department’s helicopter has served its community since 
1969.  Since its inception, Pasadena officers have become reliant upon this airborne asset 
for all types of law enforcement necessities. With the primary mission of patrolling the 
skies of Pasadena, the helicopter has often responded to other jurisdictions to answer calls 
for assistance.  Whether in its own city or not, these air patrols prevented the escape of 
fleeing criminals, provided back-up to ground officers in dire circumstances, conducted 
criminal surveillances, and provided an airborne platform to direct police operations.   
In 1999, police chiefs from Azusa, Covina, Monrovia, Pasadena, and West 
Covina met to discuss the possibility of utilizing the Pasadena Police helicopter in a 
regional manner, providing air support to patrol officers on a regular basis. These police 
chiefs represented small municipalities in the eastern portion of Los Angeles County.  In 
the past, they relied upon helicopters from the local sheriff, but over the years these 
services were reduced, rarely responding to calls in these cities. As a result, many of 
these jurisdictions relied upon Pasadena’s helicopter for emergencies. It was the desire of 
this group to stretch helicopter services over a larger region to benefit their combined 
crime fighting effort.  The police chiefs identified the need to devise some sort of regular 
air patrols for the specified reasons: 
• The helicopter provided a safe means to follow and apprehend criminals who 
flee from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, creating a hazardous climate for police 
officers chasing in cars and for citizens on the ground.  
• The helicopter allowed greater safety for citizens and police officers, as its 
response to a crime scene was expeditious. 
• The helicopter was an effective and efficient way to conduct surveillances. 
• The helicopter provided a way to coordinate ground responses to natural 
disasters, demonstrations, special events and other incidents as necessary. 
• The helicopter was a police resource to provide speedy, preventative patrols to 
high-value infrastructure targets.86 
                                                 
86 Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant (retired), Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section, Interview 
January 30, 2006. 
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These meetings resulted in a commitment to research and implement a multi-
agency team that provided air support to patrol officers on a routine and proactive basis.  
While each city faced fiscal constraints at the time, these police leaders recognized the 
need to overcome such obstacles, as they viewed crime as a regional problem to be better 
solved by regional crime fighting.87  They saw the helicopter as “an ounce of 
prevention,” and therefore rejected “a pound of cure” in the future.88  These police chiefs 
realized that a collaborative airborne effort would benefit each of their communities, 
increasing overall capabilities.  It was understood a strong and loyal partnership would be 
required to achieve the shared vision.89   
B. REGIONAL PLANNING COMMITTEE 
In order to move this idea forward, an ad hoc committee was established to 
explore the structure and implementation of a regional program.  Since inclusion was 
recognized to be an ingredient for success in this collaborative effort, the committee 
included representatives from all of the involved police agencies.   With the Pasadena 
Police Department possessing expertise in the area of helicopter operations and the assets 
necessary for the new program, it was named to chair this committee.90 A work plan to 
complete the following tasks was agreed upon by the members: 
• Initiate a trial program to test the concept. 
• Establish a cost for service. 
• Devise a formula to equitably share costs among cities. 
• Create a deployment schedule that meets the needs of each city. 
• Identify necessary personnel resources, equipment, and training. 
• Research and identify the most effective means to structure and formalize an 
agreement among the partners.91 
 
 
                                                 
87 Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant (retired), Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section, Interview 




91 Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, “Regional Helicopter 
Program Trial” (September 13, 1999), 10. 
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C. TESTING THE CONCEPT 
It was theorized that a short trial program would identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the new service.  The planning committee wanted to incrementally test the 
concept without the risk of a long-term commitment.92 Criteria were established to 
measure the program over a seven-week period.  Data culled from the experiment would 
eventually determine a baseline service level, allowing a standard to be established.  The 
following elements of the service were measured during the seven-week trial: 
• The number of responses to each city. 
• The number of helicopter initiated calls to each city. 
• The average response time to each city. 
• The number of helicopter assisted arrests for each city. 
• The total number of citizen complaints. 
• The number of calls resolved by the helicopter as Incident Report Only (IRO) 
with the assistance of ground officers.93  
In hindsight, the trial provided training and became an effective marketing tool 
for the program.  Ground officers who never utilized air support were exposed to this 
resource and learned to use its advantages, gaining valuable on-the-job-training for this 
new resource.  As air patrols assisted in the apprehension of criminals, the usefulness of 
the program was demonstrated to police personnel, community members, and politicians 
throughout the region, initiating interest from other cities.94   
1. Trial Results   
The trial period began on July 30, 1999 and ended on September 11, 1999.  Over 
the course of seven weeks, one Pasadena Police Department helicopter and crew covered 
fourteen eight-hour shifts.  The personnel costs associated with the trial period were 
based upon the overtime rates of one pilot and one observer.  Crews flew these missions 
on overtime to ensure the normal operation and services of the Pasadena helicopter to its 
local community.  The trial air patrols occurred each Friday and Saturday night and were 
proactive in nature.  
                                                 
92 Tom Oldfield, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Memorandum, “Regional Helicopter 
Program Trial” (September 13, 1999), 10. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Tom Oldfield, Interview. 
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The cost of the trial period was divided among the participants based upon the 
number of response to each city. There was no contract, joint powers agreement, or 
written document for this experiment. Based upon the historical safety record of the 
Pasadena helicopters, the police chiefs who approved this trial accepted a calculated risk 
in order to implement the program.  This was done to eliminate a protracted negotiation 
that would delay the experiment they wanted to conduct.  Since Pasadena helicopters 
flew over these cities upon the request of assistance on a regular basis, it was the 
contention of these leaders the trial period constituted an experiment of “planned mutual 
aid.”95  The outcome of the trial is explained below and summarized in Table 12.  
Table 12. FAST Trial Results (1999)96 










Azusa 35 88 15 0 2 
Monrovia 48 88 28 1 2 
West 
Covina 
104 90 49 3 5 
Total 187 89 92 4 9 
The helicopter was able to respond to each request for service in less than ninety 
seconds.  The normal response time for ground officers in these cities, for a range of 
priority calls, was five to fifteen minutes.97  The helicopter enabled the cities to be much 
more responsive to its police officers and citizens. According to the results, the helicopter 
was the first on scene over 49% of the time when it was responding to the same calls as 
ground officers.  This number is significant as the helicopter was covering three cities 
and still able to arrive before other officers half of the time.  Because each of the crews 
had to learn new geography, the speedy responses proved to be surprising.  In fourteen 
shifts, the helicopter either initiated an arrest or assisted on an arrest on nine occasions, 
making the average shift responsible or partly responsible for .64 arrests per shift.  Since 
crews only fly four and a half hours of an eight-hour shift, the arrest numbers for the 
helicopter crew was nearly double when compared to a ground officer’s arrests per shift. 
                                                 
95 Tom Oldfield, Interview. 
96 Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (July 30-September 11, 1999).   
97 Tom Oldfield, Memorandum. 
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The helicopter had many anecdotal successes that provided additional information 
for the trial period assessment.  While responding to West Covina for a hit-and-run 
collision, the helicopter was able to locate the fleeing suspect vehicle nearly one-half mile 
from the original accident scene.98  Under normal circumstances, the suspect would have 
been able to escape.  As the helicopter assisted a single ground officer on a routine traffic 
stop, the crew observed a gang fight in the rear of an apartment complex several blocks 
away.  Ground officers were notified and directed to the suspects.99 In this case, the 
proactive nature of the helicopter and its ability to view the community from a new 
dimension prevented a more serious crime from occurring.  During a burglary of a 
business in Monrovia, the helicopter provided surveillance of the suspected “getaway” 
vehicle.  When the suspects left the crime scene, the helicopter followed them to their 
residence and directed ground officers to the location, resulting in two felony arrests.100  
One citizen complaint was received during the trial period.  The complaining 
party was a resident of Monrovia who did not like the noise of the helicopter, regarding 
the airship as a nuisance.  The resident was contacted by the lieutenant of the Pasadena 
Police Helicopter Section the following day.  An explanation of the program was 
provided, along with a rudimentary overview of the benefits of having airborne police 
patrols.  The citizen was invited to participate in a tour of the Pasadena heliport and 
offered a helicopter ride to better understand how police officers in the sky added value 
to the overall police mission. After being exposed to the program, the citizen rescinded 
his complaint and told the lieutenant he believed the program would be very beneficial to 
Monrovia.101 The Pasadena Police Department did not handle all of its helicopter noise 
complaints in this manner. However, the lieutenant in charge of the section understood 
the importance of citizen acceptance of the new program.  He understood that a small 
group of angry citizens had the ability to thwart the regional helicopter initiative.102  
                                                 
98.Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (July 30-September 11, 1999).  
99 Ibid., 4. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Tom Oldfield, Interview. 
102 Ibid. 
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Some of the most significant but simple data culled from the trial period 
concerned the issue of cost sharing.  It was clear from the statistics each city received a 
disproportionate number of services relative to the other, but the services received were 
closely matched to each city’s population when compared as a percentage to the total 
population of all the cities. This is shown in Table 13.  Azusa made up 24% of the total 
population and consumed 19% of the services; Monrovia equaled 21% of the total 
population and utilized 26% of the services; West Covina comprised 55% of the total 
population and used exactly 55% of the services during the trial period. The relationship 
between population percentage and the percentage of total calls was important as it 
ultimately was the basis of the cost-sharing model devised for the permanent program.   
Table 13. FAST Population and Response Comparison (1999 Trial Period)103 
City Population Population 
Percentage 
Responses Percentage of 
Total Calls 
Azusa 45,700 24% 35 19% 
Monrovia 40,550 21% 48 26% 
West Covina 106,500 55% 104 55% 
Total 192,750 100% 187 100% 
 
2. Lessons Learned 
While the trial program was being touted a success, there were a number of 
lessons learned that required further attention and/or necessitated immediate change.  If 
the experiment was to successfully morph into a permanent program, solutions to these 
problems would need to be identified and implemented.   
Throughout the seven weeks, the cities struggled with communication between 
the various dispatch centers, helicopter, and ground officers.104  Since the three police 
departments possessed dissimilar radio frequencies, it was impossible for the helicopter 
crew to listen to each. Even with the helicopter radio placed in a scanning mode, listening 
to each of the frequencies at one time, simultaneous transmissions were covered by each 
other and not heard by the helicopter crew.  As a backup to the radio, the crew possessed 
a paging device worn by the observer for secondary contact from the three dispatch 
centers. However, this proved too cumbersome, slow, and difficult to read at night. This 
                                                 
103 Tom Oldfield, Memorandum. 
104 Ibid. 
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communication system, or lack thereof, caused problems during each shift of the trial 
period.105 To become more effective, the regional group required radio interoperability. 
Noticeably missing in the trial program was a designated liaison between the 
helicopter crew and crime fighters of the three agencies. Under normal circumstances, an 
observer assigned to a helicopter would be required to maintain daily contact with all 
police department sections in order to gain knowledge of wanted suspects, cars, and 
locations where crimes occurred.  This allowed the helicopter crew to plan and target 
specific areas for proactive patrol. Since the regional observer was from Pasadena, it was 
difficult to maintain contact with all the other cities.  The regional group required some 
sort of liaison between each of the police departments and the helicopter crew to better 
utilize the crew’s flight time when they were not responding to calls for service.106 
3. Trial Recommendation 
At the conclusion of the trial and a full assessment of the data, the planning 
committee unanimously supported the creation of a permanent program.  It also 
recommended the regional program be named the Foothill Air Support Team (FAST).  
They made the following recommendations: 
• Establish the cost of the program for each city. 
• Provide training to all patrol personnel from each of the cities to enhance the 
use of the program. 
• Identify a radio procedure or new equipment to create greater communication 
capabilities among partner cities.  
• Select and train two officers from each member city to become crew members 
(observers) on a regular basis, linking the regional crew to each agency, 
increasing information sharing in order to more efficiently fight crime. 
• Research the availability of an airborne mapping device that allowed the 
helicopter crews to easily navigate Los Angeles County.  
• Create a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) to legalize the formation of a regional 
helicopter team.107    
 
 
                                                 




D. ESTABLISHING COST  
The cost per hour for helicopter flight time was an estimate derived from the 
Direct Operating Cost (DOC) figures obtained from the aircraft manufacturer adjusted for 
the savings realized by participation in the General Services Administration (GSA) 1122 
program108 and 1033 military surplus109 program utilized by the Pasadena Police 
Department. The hourly cost of the aircraft was calculated for a Bell OH-58 turbine 
engine helicopter that was slated to be used.  This cost included jet fuel, maintenance and 
repairs.  This estimated cost was calculated using two years of historical operating 
information and found to be $130 per hour.110   
To determine the calculation for hourly crew costs (one pilot and one observer), 
the committee utilized the Pasadena Police Department’s current (fiscal year 1999) pilot 
and observer overtime pay rates.  As the committee struggled with a deployment 
schedule, it determined there were not enough trained pilots and observers to fly patrol 
missions for FAST while maintaining the necessary services to the City of Pasadena.  
Thus, an overtime rate was necessary as crews flew on their days off.  The current 
overtime hourly rate (fiscal year 1999) for the crew was $86 per hour.111 Miscellaneous 
hourly operating costs were also calculated by the ad hoc committee.  These were defined 
to include the heliport facility, catastrophic flight and liability insurance, along with an 
administrative oversight fee.  These costs were determined to be $48 per hour.112  Due to 
mandated aircraft inspections and flight preparation, along with the need to complete 
flight logs, training, and necessary refueling that takes place each shift, the average 
helicopter is in operation for only four and a half hours per eight-hour shift.  Thus, to 
                                                 
108 Section 1122 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 established the authority for state 
and local governments to purchase law enforcement equipment through federal procurement channels, 
provided the equipment is used in the performance of counter drug activities. 
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of applicable federal, state and local laws, and whose compensated law enforcement officers have powers 
of arrest and apprehension. Preference is given to counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities. 
110 Christopher O. Vicino, Commander, Special Operations Division, Pasadena Police Department, 




calculate the cost of an eight-hour shift for a FAST helicopter, the hourly crew cost of 
$86 was multiplied by eight, while the other hourly costs described above were 
multiplied by four and a half.  The sum of these two calculations equated to a total cost 
per shift of $1,490.  Based on this rate, one shift per week was $77,507 and two shifts per 
week were $155,015 annually.113  The executives of FAST opted for a deployment based 
on two weekly night shifts.114 
E. COST SHARING 
One of the most challenging aspects for the project team was to devise an 
equitable cost sharing model to establish a way for each city to only pay for the services 
it received.  The group did not want to create a formula that simply divided the total costs 
of services equally among the represented cities.  It was understood that some cities 
would utilize the services of the helicopter patrol more often than other cities based upon 
individual crime trends, demographics, and calls for service.  The challenge was to devise 
a simple way to achieve cost sharing without causing inequity or confusion.  A formula 
was put forth based upon each city’s percentage of the aggregate population of all cities 
involved.  This percentage was then used to calculate each city’s contribution by applying 
the same percentage to the total cost of air services per year.  These percentages were 
found to be equitable during the trial period; thus it was the assumption of the project 
team that percentage of population would equal the percentage of total calls for services.  
For example, since the City of Arcadia equaled 17.96% of the combined FAST cities 
population, it was theorized that this city would gain the same percentage of helicopter 
services each year, and thus be charged 17.96% of the total annual costs for the program, 
or $27,840.  Table 14 provides a summary of the FAST cost sharing formula at the 
inception of FAST in 2000, along with the total annual cost of the program established 




                                                 
113 Vicino,  Memorandum, 5. 
114 Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting Agenda and Minutes (September 25, 2000), 2. 
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Table 14. FAST Population and Cost Summary for Two Weekly Shifts (2000) 115 
City Population Percentage of 
Population 
Annual Cost 
Arcadia 52,600 17.96% $27,840 
Azusa 45,700 15.60% $24,188 
Covina 47,530 16.23% $25,157 
Monrovia 40,550 13.85% $21,462 
West Covina 106,500 36.36% $56,368 
Total 292,880 100% $155,015 
The City of Pasadena was not included in this formula.  Since it possessed its own 
helicopter patrol, the leadership of this agency did not want to reduce services to its 
community by sharing a single airship with six other municipalities.  The initial plan 
called for Pasadena to maintain its own helicopter within its city boundaries while 
deploying a second helicopter to patrol all FAST cities.116 
F. JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT (JPA) 
A legal mechanism was sought to make FAST an individual organization, 
separate from the six member cities. A simple memorandum of understanding was not 
recommended as it only created a binding agreement for services and did not create an 
independent entity recognized by law.117  A Joint Powers Agreement (JPA) granted the 
involved municipalities the power to form a singular body while retaining their current 
status as cities.  The JPA also allowed for the creation of a common treasury, which was 
required in order to properly manage the commingled municipal funds.  The creation of 
the JPA was a long and tedious process that would involve the combined efforts of each 
municipality’s legal teams.  A JPA would take into account the needs of all the cities, 
requiring the unanimous approval of the assigned legal teams, along with support from 
the affected city managers, elected officials, and chiefs of police.   
The FAST JPA required eleven months to be research, altered, reviewed, and 
signed.  It established the governance structure of FAST, calling for a Board of 
Governors (city managers) and Executive Committee (police chiefs).  The governors 
                                                 
115 Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting Agenda and Minutes (September 25, 2000), 7. 
116 Ibid., 1. 
117 Larry Newberry, Assistant City Attorney, City of Pasadena, Interview with the author, May 7, 
2000. 
 71 
were charged with policymaking and budget approval and met twice each year to review 
the program.  The committee was given the power to make decisions on a day-to-day 
basis concerning overall operations and met monthly.  The Executive Committee 
possessed a Chair, Vice Chair, Secretary, and Treasurer.  These officers of the committee 
were elected to one-year terms the governors and committee members.118   
G. IDENTIFYING THE PROPER DEPLOYMENT  
The Arcadia Police Department’s crime analysis unit provided an analysis to 
accurately prescribe the correct deployment of the helicopter.  A review of each agency’s 
calls for service was conducted to ascertain the most appropriate days of the week and 
time for the new program to be effectively scheduled.  Since only two shifts were going 
to be flown, it was important to provide coverage for the busiest days and times.  Calls 
for service were sorted by type of crime or incident, day of week, and time of day and 
cross-referenced by each agency.  From analyzing the data, two days of the week and 
time appeared to be the most relevant for each city:  Friday and Saturday nights.  The 
time identified for service was between 4:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.119 Since Pasadena Police 
Department pilots and observers were to be utilized by FAST, the deployment days and 
times had to be limited in order to not overburden personnel with excessive overtime.  
With this in mind, this initial schedule was adopted for the new program.120   
H. ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
The FAST program results are summarized in this section. They have been 
compiled to demonstrate the potential for increasing counter-terrorism capabilities among 
local law enforcement jurisdictions through the consolidation of specific services. These 
statistics include evidence of economies of scale, a pertinent and necessary by-product of 
resource sharing if such a model is to be utilized to fight terrorism. Such cost savings are 
disputed in the current literature concerning police consolidation and service mergers, but 
appear to be evident in the FAST model.  They are important, as they allow saved money 
to be expended on additional counter terror resources or initiatives to provide even 
greater security from terrorism. 
                                                 
118 Foothill Air Support Team, Joint Powers Agreement (August 1, 2000), 2-9. 
119 Captain Bob Sanderson, Arcadia Police Department, Memorandum, “FAST Helicopter Call for 
Service Time Survey” (September 26, 2000), 1-10. 
120 Foothill Air Support Team, Meeting and Agenda Minutes. 
 72 
Table 15 summarizes the first five months of FAST. Once again, the consistent 
relationship between the “percentage of population” and the “percentage of total calls” is 
observed.  Each city’s percentage of population is ± 5 percentage points of the percentage 
of total calls.  The FAST executives determined this to be an acceptable range to continue 
using this formula. Amazingly, the airship was able to respond to calls on an average of 
fifty seconds or less: thirty-nine seconds faster when compared to the seven-week trial 
period.  It was theorized that the crew was becoming more accustomed to the geography 
of these cities, allowing them to navigate and respond more quickly. 
Table 15. FAST Statistics 2000 (Aug. to Dec.)121 






















Arcadia 52,600 17.96% $27,840 83 14.58% 44 31 23 4 
Azusa 45,700 15.60% $24,188 97 17.05% 53 25 18 9 
Covina 47,530 16.23% $25,157 87 15.29% 44 24 12 3 
Monrovia 40,550 13.85% $21,462 98 17.22% 41 23 17 7 
West 
Covina 
106,500 36.36% $56,368 204 35.86% 71 37 38 15 
Total 292,880 100% $155,015 569 100% 50 140 108 38 
Tables 16 and 17 are provided to demonstrate economies of scale occurring in the 
FAST model.  These tables compare the same twelve-month periods of the program in 
2001 and 2002.  With the City of Alhambra joining FAST in mid-2001, costs were 
decreased to each agency by an average of 4.74%.  Calls for service increased by 103%, 
documented in the column labeled “calls per city.”  Average response time decreased 
from sixty-eight to sixty-two seconds.  Remarkably, FAST doubled its output over this 
time period and was still able to respond to calls more quickly. Last, the helicopter 
increased its involvement in arrests from forty-one to 106, or 158%.   
                                                 
121 Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (August-December 2000). 
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Table 16. FAST Statistics 2001 (Jan. to Dec.)122 






















Alhambra 91,000 23.70% $36,738 102 10.54% 45 29 9 4 
Arcadia 52,600 13.71% $21,253 110 11.36% 60 81 21 3 
Azusa 45,700 11.91% $18,462 209 21.59% 71 69 34 8 
Covina 47,530 12.38% $19,191 121 12.51% 77 52 26 6 
Monrovia 40,550 10.56% $16,369 88 9.09% 69 25 24 5 
West 
Covina 
106,500 27.74% $43,002 338 34.91% 89 49 66 15 
Total 383,880 100% $155,015 968 100% 68 305 180 41 
 
Table 17. FAST Statistics 2002 (Jan. to Dec.)123 






















Alhambra 91,000 23.70% $36,738 332 16.91% 79 56 112 13 
Arcadia 52,600 13.71% $21,253 253 12.88% 49 51 102 9 
Azusa 45,700 11.91% $18,462 273 13.91% 64 71 109 18 
Covina 47,530 12.38% $19,191 292 14.86% 73 50 145 11 
Monrovia 40,550 10.56% $16,369 311 15.83% 55 44 155 19 
West 
Covina 
106,500 27.74% $43,002 503 25.61% 62 104 229 23 
Total 383,880 100% $155,015 1964 100% 62 383 855 106 
Since Alhambra joined FAST in mid-year, its percentage of population was out of 
synch with its percentage of total population for 2001.  The relationship between these 
two percentages regained its ± 5 percentage ratio in its first full year of participation, as 
seen in Table 17.   
While Tables 16 and 17 do not reflect a change in mission, the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks altered the FAST program.  The regional helicopter took on an 
additional duty: providing for greater prevention and protection from terrorism.  This was 
achieved by utilizing the helicopter to make preventative patrols to each city’s high risk 
infrastructure targets, flying surveillance missions for counter-terrorism investigations, 
and using its regional framework to further information sharing and communication as it 
related to possible threats.   
                                                 
122 Pasadena Police Department, Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January -December 2001). 
123 Ibid. 
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In 2003, the FAST budget was augmented to reflect a 7.5% increase in salaries 
and a 150% jump in the price of jet fuel.124 Additionally, the helicopter was found to 
average thirty calls for service each month on non-FAST operational days.  While the 
Pasadena chief of police initially authorized this additional service to be absorbed by his 
police department, it was an economic burden. Thus, the cost of these services was 
calculated into the new cost of FAST.125  Beginning in 2003, the FAST executives 
authorized an annual cost increase of $98,641, making the total annual cost of service 
$253,656, or 64% higher than the previous year, as noted in Table 18. This was an 
average cost increase of $16,440 to each city.  For the two largest municipalities, West 
Covina and Alhambra, it meant an increase of $27,362 and $23,378, respectively, based 
upon the cost-sharing model. 
Table 18. FAST Statistics 2003 (Jan. to Dec.)126 






















Alhambra 91,000 23.70% $60,116 347 16.25% 63 64 165 8 
Arcadia 52,600 13.71% $34,776 224 10.49% 58 63 125 9 
Azusa 45,700 11.91% $30,211 377 17.64% 60 92 147 23 
Covina 47,530 12.38% $31,403 344 16.11% 63 78 199 15 
Monrovia 40,550 10.56% $26,786 323 15.12% 61 64 179 14 
West 
Covina 
106,500 27.74% $70,364 521 24.39% 76 140 219 31 
Total 383,880 100% $253,656 2,136 100% 61 511 1039 105 
The 2003 FAST statistics captured in Table 18 represent an all-time high in the 
area of calls for service (2,136) for the program. This is an increase of 8.75% from the 
previous year.  Helicopter involved arrests remained consistent, along with the average 
response time to calls.  The crew and helicopter arrived first on scene more times in 2003 
than any other previous year.  This was attributed to a shortage of personnel in patrol 
during this time period for each of the cities.127  
Table 19 substantiates an emerging trend for FAST. The relationship between 
percentage of total population and percentage of total calls for the City of Alhambra were 
                                                 
124 Vicino, Memorandum, 1-5.  
125 Ibid., 2-3. 
126 Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January -December 2003). 
127 Tom Oldfield, Interview. 
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inconsistent with the cost sharing model two years in a row. It appeared that Alhambra 
was either underutilizing the program, or the city’s call types did not require the response 
of air support.    
Table 19. FAST Statistics 2004 (Jan. to Dec.)128 






















Alhambra 91,000 23.70% $60,116 266 15.37% 67 51 54 7 
Arcadia 52,600 13.71% $34,776 221 12.77% 55 59 79 12 
Azusa 45,700 11.91% $30,211 254 14.68% 86 79 59 29 
Covina 47,530 12.38% $31,403 284 16.41% 72 81 87 25 
Monrovia 40,550 10.56% $26,786 239 13.80% 52 31 79 18 
West 
Covina 
106,500 27.74% $70,364 467 26.97% 87 156 93 23 
Total 383,880 100% $253,656 1731 100% 69 483 457 115 
While the number of total calls appeared to decrease for 2003, the reduced 
number is attributed to a reporting procedure instituted during the year.129 Crews were 
instructed not to report self initiated calls in the incident report only (IRO) category any 
longer.  This resulted in a 56% reduction for the year in IRO calls when compared to 
2003, impacting the total number of calls per city.  The number helicopter involved 
arrests increased by 9.5%, with most other categories remaining relatively similar to the 
previous year.  
In late 2005, the City of San Marino joined the FAST program. Because this 
municipality only possesses a population of 13,217, it did not reduce costs significantly 
for the other members. However, it demonstrated the desire possessed by other area cities 
to increase overall capabilities in the area of crime fighting and counter terrorism.  For 
the most part, the statistics for 2005 remained similar to previous years, with Alhambra 




                                                 
128 Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January-December 2004). 
129 Bob Mulhall, Lieutenant, Pasadena Police Department, Air Operations Section, Interview, January 
3, 2006. 
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Table 20. FAST Statistics 2005 (Jan. to Dec.)130 






















Alhambra 91,000 22.92% $58,137 170 11.55% 81 33 89 6 
Arcadia 52,600 13.25% $33,609 174 11.81% 66 40 70 4 
Azusa 45,700 11.51% $29,195 227 15.41% 84 59 86 10 
Covina 47,530 11.96% $30,337 276 18.73% 96 68 132 17 
Monrovia 40,550 10.22% $25,923 202 13.71% 72 41 76 21 
San 
Marino 
13,217 3.32% $8,116 24 1.52% 126 2 33 2 
West 
Covina 
106,500 26.82% $68,030 401 27.27% 91 131 175 27 
Total 397,097 100% $253,656 1474 100% 82 393 661 101 
Projected cost overruns for 2006 required the FAST Board of Governors to 
approve an increased budget for fiscal year 2006-2007.131  These overages were caused 
by a 20% increase in salaries over the past three and a half years, along with a 150% 
increase in the cost of jet fuel.  The board approved an annual budget in the amount of 
$322,608.132  This constituted an increase of 27%.   
However, with the cities of Glendora and South Pasadena joining FAST in 2006, 
most of these projected cost increases are minimized. With the addition of the two new 
members, the total population of citizens served by FAST increases from 397,097 to 
475,259.  Because the cost-sharing model is based upon the percentage of population 
represented by each of the cities, the cost increase calculated of 27% is balanced by a 
population increase of 20%. 
Table 21 depicts the cost sharing formula for 2006 with the additional members to 
FAST.  The percentages of population have decreased, maintaining a reasonable level of 
increase to each city. 
Table 21. 2006 Projected FAST Population and Cost Summary 





Alhambra 91,000 19.15% $61,779 
Arcadia 52,600 11.07% $35,712 
Azusa 45,700 9.61% $31,002 
                                                 
130 Pasadena Police Department Helicopter Section Flight Logs (January-December 2005). 
131 Rod Uyeda, Commander, Special Operations Division, Pasadena Police Department, 
Memorandum, “Cost Adjustment Report” (September 1, 2005), 1-7. 
132 Ibid. 
 77 
Glendora 52,373 11.02% $35,551 
Covina 47,530 10.00% $32,260 
Monrovia 40,550 8.53% $27,518 
San Marino 13,217 2.78% $8,968 
South 
Pasadena 
25,789 5.43% $17,517 
West 
Covina 
106,500 22.41% $72,296 
Total 475,259 100% $322,608 
 
Since the 20% cost enhancement is shared among the members and balanced by the new 
participating cities, it resulted in the following minimal annual increases: Alhambra 
$3,642; Arcadia $2,103; Azusa $1,807; Covina $1,923; Monrovia $1,595; San Marino 
$852; and West Covina $4,266.  It appears the economies of scale observed in the first 
two years continue to hold in the program’s sixth year. 
I. CREATING A REGIONAL CULTURE 
The success of the FAST program is directly linked to its methodology as it 
relates to the creation of a regional atmosphere.  The leadership of FAST devised a 
strategy and day-to-day philosophy of inclusion and shared power.  These police chiefs 
set the tone for sharing and collaborating in an unprecedented manner.  Their 
subordinates followed and established strong working relationships with each member 
city.  Without buy-in and direct involvement from these top executives, this program 
would not have achieved success.  In addition to this strong leadership, there were several 
key initiatives that also assisted in creating a culture of sharing among these cities: 
• Monthly meetings were established for the Board of Directors (chiefs of 
police) and alternates (operational commanders). 
• A bi-annual meeting was established for the Board of Governance (City 
Managers). 
• Each of the cities provided personnel resources to be trained as crewmembers 
(observers).  After being properly trained, these observers were assigned shifts 
in an equal rotation.  They provided FAST with a liaison among departments, 
improving information sharing, communication, and teamwork. 
• A FAST logo was created for the two regional helicopters.  It included the 
names of each city.  The logos were prominently displayed on the assigned air 
ships. 
• A separate FAST uniform patch was developed for the flight crews.   
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• The Pasadena chief of police authorized the Pasadena Police helicopter 
responses to emergency priority calls to the other member cities during non-
FAST hours in order to demonstrate the willingness to share this resource. 
• The Pasadena chief of police authorized the Pasadena Police helicopter to 
appear at to community events in all member cities in order to garner support 
from citizens and politicians.  
• The structure of governance provided equal voting power and an annual 
rotation of prominent positions on the Executive Board and Board of 
Governors.  
• The West Covina chief of police authorized his department’s assigned 
observer to begin training to become a pilot, the first non-Pasadena 
crewmember to fly the FAST ships.   
FAST leadership has found a way to contain and overcome the turf battles 
historically prevalent between law enforcement agencies.  It appears they have put aside 
the ego driven decision making that is common in the police profession and replaced it 
with a “good of the cause” mentality that supports the growth of crime fighting and 
counter-terrorism capabilities.   
J. NEXT STEPS   
Additional cities have demonstrated interest in joining FAST. Table 22 provides a 
list of the current member cities and other municipalities that have expressed a desire to 
join in the future. The population percentages (cost sharing percentages) for each have 
been identified and calculated as a percentage of the total.  If this was the future of FAST, 
accommodating this large collaborative effort for helicopter services would require 
“thinking anew”.  Consideration would need to be given to deploying two helicopters for 
each shift while adding the City of Pasadena to the cost sharing equation.  This would 
require Pasadena to share helicopter services, abandoning the deployment of an 
individual ship assigned solely to its own jurisdiction.  If this next step were completed, it 
would truly regionalize police air support services in Los Angeles County, stretching 
counter terrorism capabilities even further. Reduced costs would be gained by all of the 
involved partners.  For example, the City of West Covina would decrease its annual 




Table 22. The Future of FAST 
Agency Population Percentage 
of Total 
Population 
Alhambra 91,000 7.52% 
Arcadia 52,600 4.35% 
Azusa 45,700 3.77% 
Burbank 105,300 8.71% 
Covina 47,530 3.94% 
Duarte 21,486 1.78% 
Glendale 199,178 16.47% 
Glendora 52,373 4.34% 
El Monte 115,965 9.59% 
Monrovia 40,550 3.35% 
Pasadena 142,000 11.75% 
Pomona 150,000 12.41% 







Total 1,209,188 100% 
The FAST model is applicable to police services that may be shared among 
jurisdictions.  Why not construct the same-shared principles for local counter terrorism 
investigations, dual use canines (bomb and drug detecting), or the building of radio and 
computer interoperability?  FAST is a flexible template that should be used as a national 





























The approximate 750,000 American police officers on the job today are 
considered an important element of the overall terrorism prevention and protection 
apparatus established after September 11, 2001.  However, the current structure of 
policing deludes the potency of these resources and needs to be reshaped in order to 
maximize these human assets, establishing the best possible defense against terrorism. 
With nearly 18,000 police departments in the United States, the number of overlapping 
services and police responsibilities have become overwhelming and a hindrance to the 
war on terrorism.  Police resources within every state are being wasted as jurisdictional 
responsibilities are duplicated among agencies.  Local police should be restructured to 
maximize resources, potentially expanding capabilities for the dual purpose of fighting 
crime and terrorism.   
With over 52% of the United States law enforcement agencies possessing less 
than 10 full-time police officers133, the overall American strategy to defend against 
terrorism is diminished as these smaller police departments lack the resources to properly 
staff, train, and equip any of the elements necessary to effectively prevent, protect, and 
respond to an attack.  While this thesis has identified numerous government studies 
concluding American policing is far to decentralized, the recommended solutions to 
reduce fragmentation and overlap have not been carried out.  Does it make sense to use 
the framework of policing that was devised in the late 1800s?  Today’s society requires a 
new model of policing.  One that is adaptive, resilient, and able to provide the best 
possible defense from terrorism.  Alterations to the American police model have not 
occurred on a broad scale for two specific reasons: 
• A lack of empirical data showing a centralized form of policing to be more 
effective and efficient than the current decentralized model.   
• The real or perceived desire of citizens and/or politicians to retain local 
control of police agencies.  
                                                 
133 U.S. Department of Justice, Census, 3. 
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However, this thesis has produced anecdotal information from panel interviews 
and data synthesized from previously conducted citizen surveys suggesting the 
acceptance level of consolidating police organizations or services is higher than properly 
credited in most research. The belief that citizens have a great desire to control the local 
police force was questioned with the results obtained from the 1973 Kansas City 
Preventative Patrol study, as data obtained from this experiment suggested citizens are 
not impacted or even notice a change of police operations at the patrol level.  Theses 
results diminish the issue of local control by making relevant the following question:  If 
citizens do not notice the changes occurring in the local police force, how much control 
are they truly exercising?  How much control do they truly need or want?   
The panel interviews also produced an onslaught of interesting emerging trends 
and possible future events that would potentially alter law enforcement’s configuration, 
impacting how police would combat terrorism.  Some of the trends and events positively 
impact the development of a consolidated police model, while other trends and events 
hinder the models implementation. 
The following trends and events identified by the panels were projected to have 
the most positive impact, increasing the likelihood of a consolidated police model:  
• Tr-1(Professional Panel): Resource sharing by cities to enhance effectiveness 
and lower costs. 
• Tr-4 (Professional Panel): The cost of police personnel. 
• Tr-5(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of multi-agency task forces 
formed by local police departments. 
• Ev-1(Professional Panel): A second large terrorist attack on the United States. 
• Ev-5(Professional Panel): Police officers forming a statewide union. 
• Ev-2(Law Enforcement Panel): A Bio-terrorism attack on the United States. 
Conversely, the following trends and events identified by the panels were projected to 
have the most negative impact, decreasing the likelihood of a consolidated police model: 
• Tr-3(Professional Panel): The desire to have local control of police. 
• Tr-1(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of differing benefit packages 
among police departments. 
• Tr-2(Law Enforcement Panel): The number of community oversight bodies 
governing police departments. 
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• Tr-4(Law Enforcement Panel): The desire for politicians to have local control 
of police. 
• Ev-1(Law Enforcement Panel): A Second great depression. 
• Ev-5(Law Enforcement Panel): A major police corruption scandal. 
The FAST case study demonstrated an effective way to increase counter terrorism 
capabilities as it provided an equitable cost sharing formula and implementation model 
that may be duplicated nationally. FAST may be copied for functional consolidations, 
reducing duplication and redundancy in police services within a given region. FAST has 
overcome the traditional turf battles that often occur among contiguous police agencies, 
reinforcing the notion that cooperation and coordination has always been possible.   
B. THE EXPERIENCE OF CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG  
An interview with Assistant Chief David Stephens of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Police Department (CMPD) was conducted for this thesis.  Chief Stephens has served 30 
years with the CMPD and was an integral member of the planning team when the City of 
Charlotte and Mecklenburg County consolidated police services in 1992.  Considering his 
role in this process, his professional observations and experiences involving the issues of 
police consolidation provide important insight for this research.  
The city-county merger of police services between Charlotte and Mecklenburg 
County resulted from a tax inequity between city and county residents.134  Because the 
two jurisdictions shared 80% of the same geographical area, the two entities possessed 
overlapping responsibilities and services.  Based upon the taxes levied, city residents 
supplied greater financial support for police services, while county residents were able to 
glean the same benefits and utilize police services without the same tax burden.135 
Merging the city and county law enforcement departments projected a reduction in taxes 
for the average citizen.    
The impetus for the consolidation of police services between Charlotte and 
Mecklenburg County came from the citizens, not the local politicians.136  While the 
                                                 





mayor of Charlotte supported the idea of merging services, the majority of elected 
officials resisted the effort, attempting to dissuade constituencies from supporting it. 137  
The observations during this consolidation supported data culled from the NGT process 
of this thesis and previously conducted citizen satisfaction surveys regarding 
consolidation:  A citizen’s level of tolerance for consolidation of police services is much 
higher than previous research suggested and is dissimilar to the ideals projected by most 
local politicians.  
While the consolidation of the CMPD created an equitable sharing of taxes among 
area residents, it is unclear whether or not the merger reduced the overall cost of police 
services.  With the city increasing its population by over 200,000 residents between 1992 
and 2005, the cost of police services has increased with population and service 
demands.138  After the merger, CMPD experienced a lower crime rate. This was 
attributed to greater coordination of law enforcement resources within the jurisdiction.139  
Investigations that impacted the entire region that had been previously difficult to manage 
among the many small police agencies in the county were now consolidated into one 
investigation. Communication and the sharing of information were normalized with the 
merger.  The overall effectiveness of the police department was increased.140  
 The CMPD has increased its counter terrorism capabilities as a result of the 
consolidation.141 Through the merger, personnel resources were increased; greater 
coordination, cooperation and sharing were gained; and, an interoperable computer and 
radio system was designed. The combination of these changes has allowed CMPD to 
provide greater protection from terrorism for its community.142    
 
 
                                                 







C. POLICY OPTIONS 
For the purpose of this thesis, three policy options have been created, along with a 
recommendation for consideration.  These options involve maintaining the status quo, 
merging police services, or forming a national police force.   
1. Maintain Status Quo 
When contemplating different policy options to address existing problems, doing 
nothing, or remaining status quo, is always an alternative.  This is true for the issue being 
researched in this thesis. Thus, the first option for consideration is to retain the 
decentralized police model in its current form.  If this option is selected, several strategic 
initiatives are necessary to reduce or eliminate some of the major challenges created by 
today’s policing structure.  These initiatives will allow for an acceptable level of counter- 
terrorism capabilities within the framework of the current police model. 
Great priority should be given to closing the technological gap that exists among 
local police departments.  Fusing police technologies would increase communication 
capabilities and induce information sharing. This may be achieved through the creation of 
national policies to standardize radio equipment and infrastructure, along with police 
computer systems.  This is being done in some realms, but not in others.  This 
inconsistent approach amplifies an already challenging issue.  To illustrate, an example is 
provided from the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). 
a. Standardize Radio Infrastructure 
The FCC continues to standardize radio frequencies for public safety 
agencies across the United States in order to facilitate communication among first 
responders.  The preservation of this spectrum assures police, fire, and emergency 
medical services non-interference from private broadcasts, increasing the effective and 
efficient flow of pertinent information among users.  With this policy, the FCC provides 
priority to first responders.  Contrary to this ideal, the FCC does not standardize radio 
infrastructure components for public safety.  This has resulted in the use of competing 
technology and the building of disparate radio systems incapable of being linked 
together.  This reduces the first responders’ ability to properly communicate across 
jurisdictional lines, making the standardization of frequencies irrelevant.   
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A current example of this exists within Los Angeles County as several 
independent cities and the county are concurrently devise an interoperable radio system 
for the region. The cities are building the Interagency Communications Interoperability 
System (ICIS) while the county is constructing the Los Angeles Regional Tactical 
Communications System (LARTCS).  ICIS is utilizing “trunking” technology that allows 
the sharing of a small number of communications paths among a large number of users, 
managed by proprietary software.  ICIS is a digital system and may not be blended with 
an analog radio system.  LARTCS uses current and past technologies with existing radio 
backbones by installing repeaters that merge disparate radio frequencies.  LARTCS is an 
analog system that may not be blended with a digital system.  Establishing a national 
policy to standardize radio systems eliminates duplication and the development of 
competing radio infrastructures that are unable to work together.  Divergent technologies 
only widen the communication and information-sharing gap that already exists among the 
many law enforcement agencies.  While these separate entities construct different radio 
systems, they run the risk of failure as they seek funding from the same sources.  It would 
be more sensible to work together on such an interoperable radio project, allowing for the 
sharing of resources and not diluting funding opportunities with multiple initiatives.   
b. Standardize Computer Systems 
If police departments are to remain independent of each other, and the 
status quo remains, a national policy for the standardization of law enforcement computer 
systems is a necessary strategic initiative to overcome the information sharing obstacles 
that are inherent in the decentralized police model.   
The 9/11 Commission indicated that federal law enforcement 
organizations around the country did not have the technological capacity to access other 
agency databases.143  The federal government consolidated most of its law enforcement 
and intelligence entities under one departmental umbrella to cope with this problem.  
Local police do not share information with each other very well either.  While access to  
 
 
                                                 
143 9/11 Commission Report, 245-257.  
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national databases exist and are shared for missing persons, warrants, and runaway 
juveniles, most city and county police agencies possess dissimilar computer systems that 
are incapable of being linked together.   
As most police departments possess a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), 
Records Management System (RMS) and Mobile Data Computer (MDC) solution to 
manage information, these computer modules are not linked to neighboring police 
agencies.  In other words, local cops cannot access each other’s information.  In fact, the 
computer systems within local police agencies are so dissimilar that initiating an interface 
among all of them is unfathomable. These circumstances are the direct result of the 
decentralized police model. 
Without greater technological fusion linking police agencies, adequate 
communication and the sharing of critical information will remain difficult at best.  If the 
status quo is an acceptable policy option, the minimal alteration to the current system 
would be the standardization of radio equipment/infrastructure and computer systems.  At 
the very least, this would allow the many police departments within a given area the 
ability to communicate and share. 
2. Consolidate Police Services 
Identifying and eliminating the overlapping services among area police agencies 
through consolidation potentially results in a monetary savings relating to personnel 
costs.  This is a means to fight terrorism more effectively without merging entire police 
organizations as the monies saved may be utilized for additional training, personnel, or 
equipment to bolster counter terrorism capabilities.  By joining forces in such a manner, 
police departments are able to achieve together what they could not individually. The 
FAST model from Chapter V demonstrates the potential of collaborative efforts and the 
possible positive impact to a larger region of communities.  The Department of 
Homeland Security has the ability to provide funding through its Urban Area Strategic 
Initiatives (UASI) to assist in the development of these collaborative efforts. 
a. Restructure the Urban Area Strategic Initiative (UASI) 
As mentioned in Chapter I, DHS recently released the National 
Preparedness Goals (NPG).  Of the seven goals, three directly relate to building counter-
terrorism capabilities among jurisdictions, alluding to the need for local governments to 
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serve an entire region instead of limiting resources to individual communities.  Contrary 
to the regional philosophy outlined in the NPG, DHS has not formatted the Urban Area 
Strategic Initiative (UASI) in support of its own objectives.  
Synchronizing the UASI with the NPG is tantamount to creating an 
expansion of counter-terrorism capabilities.  Revising the process should focus on the 
distribution of funds for the contiguous cities associated with the specified urban area.  
These cities are defined as being adjacent to, or within 10 miles from, the border of an 
identified urban area.144  UASI money is based upon risk assessment that considers large 
populations in conjunction with viable terrorist targets.  Money is provided to those urban 
areas and its contiguous cities to increase counter-terrorism capabilities.  In most cases, 
large municipal and county governments benefit from this type of funding as they are the 
most likely agencies to meet the criteria.  These larger entities act as grant administrators, 
making decisions on the format of the disbursement schedule.  There is no requirement 
for them to allocate funds equally.  The funding format is created by the administrator.  
Since these large city organizations do not traditionally rely upon mutual aid, there is no 
incentive for them to cooperate with smaller jurisdictions for the purposes of counter- 
terrorism improvement in the region.   
The Los Angeles urban area provides insights as to how the NPG is not 
being served by the UASI. For 2006, this urban area offering is approximately 
$110,000,000.  These monies are offered to the Cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach, 
Los Angeles County, and twenty-one contiguous municipalities as defined by the 
initiative set forth by DHS.145  The Los Angeles UASI governance structure is as 
follows: 
• Urban Area Grant Administrator (UAGA):  The City of Los Angeles acts as 
the grant administrator, setting up the governance structure, assigning the 
voting privileges, and determining the representation of the UAAA and 
UAWG. 
                                                 
144 Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative Eligible 
Applicants, available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY06_UASI_Eligibility_List.pfd, 
accessed on March 1, 2006. 
145 The twenty-one contiguous cities for the Los Angeles UASI include: Alhambra, Baldwin Park, 
Beverly Hills, Burbank, Culver City, El Segundo, Gardena, Glendale, Hawthorne, Hermosa Beach, 
Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Monterey Park, Pasadena, Redondo Beach, San Fernando, Santa Monica, 
South Pasadena, Torrance, Vernon, and Whittier. 
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• Urban Area Approval Authority (UAAA):  This committee has the final vote 
on initiatives and expenditures.  There are eleven voting members.   
• Urban Area Working Group (UAWG):  This committee prioritizes initiatives, 
making final recommendations of expenditures to the Urban Area Approval 
Authority.  There are eighteen voting members.   
• Sub-Group Representatives:  Employees associated with one of the urban area 
cities or county may belong to one of the sub-groups.  Sub-group members 
have no voting rights and are only able to make suggestions and provide 
official requests to the UAWG. 
The power of the Los Angeles UASI governance structure is embedded in 
the working group (UAWG), as this committee decides which initiatives will be reviewed 
by the approval authority (UAAA).  While sub-group members represent each of the 
agencies, this group only makes recommendations and is not allowed to vote on matters 
of disbursement.  Historically, the approval authority has endorsed the recommendations 
of the working group without modifications, making the UAWG the most powerful 
committee associated with the Los Angeles urban area. 
The votes allotted for each committee appear in Table 22. A clear 
discrepancy exists in the votes allotted to the City of Los Angeles and the City of Long 
Beach when compared to the County of Los Angeles and the twenty-one contiguous 
cities.  It would seem the city and county of Los Angeles would receive equal votes while 
the City of Long Beach and contiguous cities would receive proportional votes based 
upon viable targets and population.  Clearly, the Los Angeles UASI voting power is not 
distributed equally.  This has resulted in a controversial vote, when the working group 
reduced the priority level of all the 2006 initiatives recommended by the sub-groups 
representing the twenty-one contiguous cities.  With a reduced priority level the 
contiguous cities will not receive funding for the 2006 Los Angeles UASI.  Such 
aggressive politics in search of achieving individual city programs will not produce the 
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1,558,971 
In order to achieve the NPG of regional collaboration, interoperability and 
an increase in regional counter terrorism capabilities, the UASI should be altered as 
follows: 
• Create a consistent and equal structure of governance applicable to each 
designated urban area. Allocate votes for represented agencies as a percentage 
of total population.149   
• Designate 10% of the total UASI offering to be utilized by contiguous cities in 
each designated urban area for regional counter terrorism initiatives involving 
multiple jurisdictions.  Allocation of funding shall be determined by a 
majority vote of the contiguous cities. 
• Designate 10% of the total UASI offering to be utilized by contiguous cities in 
each designated urban area for sustainment funding for regional counter 
terrorism for already existing initiatives involving multiple jurisdictions. 
Allocation of funding shall be determined by a majority vote of the contiguous 
cities. 
• Designate 5% of the total UASI offering to be utilized for infrastructure 
protection for the most critical locations as identified by the UAWG and 
approved by the UAAA. 
                                                 
146 Raymond Edey, Commander, Glendale Police Department, e-mail re UASI process, February 16, 
2006. 
147 Ibid. 
148 California Department of Finance, Demographic Estimates, Los Angeles County (2005) 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/ 
149 The Los Angeles UASI population total is 8,315,451.  The City of Los Angeles represents 41%; 
the City of Long Beach represents 6%; the County of Los Angeles represents 34%; and, the contiguous 
cities represent 19% of the overall population.  Votes would be distributed in these same percentages for 
both the UAAA and UAWG. 
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These altered UASI guidelines balance the power of the urban area 
governance, ensuring the development and maintenance of regional counter terrorism 
capabilities, while supporting the NPG of DHS. 
3. Consolidate Police Departments 
Consolidation closes the gaps identified in the current American police model 
through the unification of organizations. The consolidation of local police departments 
normalizes interaction among the merging agencies and provides for unity of command, 
effort, and purpose.   
• Unity of Command:  Consolidation allows for the application of a consistent 
philosophy and methodology, as one person is providing leadership instead of 
many.  
• Unity of Effort: Consolidation reduces or eliminates duplication of 
responsibilities and assignments, creating a more succinct and effective effort.  
• Unity of Purpose:  Consolidation forms a single police department, focusing 
and working in unison to obtain common goals.    
The 9/11 Commission Report indicates the need for the national security 
institutions of the United States government to achieve unity of effort by reconfiguring in 
a “smart” manner.150  The commission describes a framework of agencies duplicating 
efforts, working independently, and not having someone in charge with the ability to 
cross agency boundaries while providing overall direction.151 The commission asserts the 
current structure of government does not provide the best protection for citizens and the 
need for “quick, imaginative, and agile” change.152  
The men and women of the World War II generation rose to the 
challenges of the 1940s and 1950s.  They reconstructed the government so 
that it could protect the country.  That is now the job of the generation that 
experienced 9/11.  Those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing 
business rooted in a different era are just not good enough. Americans 
should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed 
generations ago for the world that no longer exists.153 
                                                 
150 9/11 Commission Report, 401. 
151 Ibid., 401-403. 
152 Ibid., 399. 
153 Ibid. 
 92 
Among its many recommendations to reshape the federal government, the 
commission commonly identified the need to merge organizations, integrate 
departments, consolidate responsibilities, and create standardization for the 
purposes of fighting terrorism.154 Local police departments require the same type 
of reorganization for the same purpose. 
a. Implement a National Police Force 
Creating a national police agency does not require the federalization of all 
state and local police departments.  It does, however, require federal legislation 
mandating an alteration to the current police structure.  Police are a national resource to 
fight crime and terrorism. They should be reformatted by the federal government to meet 
the needs of this era.  The intent of this legislation should be to provide a standard 
approach to the most critical elements associated with policing, while allowing state and 
city officials leadership and management of the day-to-day operations, providing for the 
best possible law enforcement services for individualized communities.  Such legislation 
would be developed with assistance from law enforcement leaders, line personnel, and 
citizens throughout the nation.  Organizations with the research and development abilities 
similar to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police would be necessary to provide direct and oversight to the preparation 
of any legislation concerning the development of a national police force.  These 
stakeholders would assist in creating a national debate on the subject, allowing greater 
buy-in from every state and local entity.   Some of the crucial issues legislation should 
consider are: 
• Standardization of technologies, including but not limited to computer and 
radio infrastructures, allowing for ease in interoperability and agency-to-
agency interfaces. 
• Development of like salaries, benefits, and rank structure to allow lateral 
movement of personnel, providing the ability to increase resources to a 
specified area when necessary. 
• Allowance for sworn officers employed by the national police to enforce the 
laws of every state and municipality.  Such a provision would nationalize 
mutual aid, much like the fire service. 
                                                 
154 9/11 Commission Report, 403-419. 
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•  Provide for a new structure of policing that supports the new national element 
but gives local control to states and municipalities.   
Stephen Flynn, author of America the Vulnerable, proposes a national 
homeland security structure modeled after the Federal Reserve System.155  Flynn’s idea 
is to create a federal agency that coordinates all aspects of homeland security prevention, 
protection, and response.  He utilizes the Federal Reserve as an example because it has 
demonstrated the ability to work with public and private partners, and has retained a 
certain amount of independence from the executive and legislative branches.  With slight 
modifications, his idea has the potential to be applied to the building of a new national 
police model.  An example of this is as follows: 
• National Governance Committee:  Members of this board would be 
responsible for establishing and maintaining national police policy and 
standards, along with defining the role of the national police force in fighting 
the war on terrorism.  They would report to congress, create the annual police 
budget, and ultimately be responsible for providing the necessary resources 
for the police. This board would be policy-making in nature and not involve 
itself with operational matters. The members of this committee would be 
appointed by the President, House of Representatives, and Senate, in equal 
numbers, and serve ten-year terms. 
• State Board of Trustees: Each of the fifty states would establish a board of 
trustees that would be responsible for researching and recommending police 
training and operations consistent with the needs of each state, in alignment 
with the National Governance Committee established policies.  The Governor 
of each state would appoint trustees with two-thirds approval from the state 
legislative body.  Trustees would serve seven-year terms.   
• Metropolitan Executive Board: This board would consist of city managers or 
mayors, from each city represented within the defined metropolitan area.  
These executives would be responsible for overseeing the areas’ police force.  
They would ensure the non-duplication of services, maintain accountability to 
the public, and provide local leadership and direction.    
Funding for a national police department would be divided among all 
levels of government.  This would possibly eliminate the need for the current UASI, as 
federal money would already be provided, in conjunction with state and local funding for 
police.  With a national police agency, it is theorized that counter-terrorism capabilities 
would be increased as each element of the police force would receive the same training, 
equipment, and have access to the same resources. 
                                                 
155 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable (New York: Harper, 2004), 144-155. 
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D. RECOMMENDATION 
A combination of the first and second policy option is recommended.  These two 
policies are achievable, while the third option possesses far too many challenges to 
effectively complete in a reasonable timeframe.  Creating police standardization in the 
area of radio infrastructure and computer systems is a difficult task, but not impossible.  
This may be accomplished by federal mandate or through the legislative process. This is 
not a drastic approach to interoperability considering the slow progress in this area since 
2001.  A federal mandate is far overdue.  While the UASI was reconfigured just one year 
ago, this thesis provides evidence that it is flawed and open to manipulation in its current 
state.  The UASI must be aligned with the NPG; otherwise these goals will never be 
obtained.  
The standardization described in the first policy option will allow police 
departments to work more closely together, building trust and teamwork.  The second 
policy option will create the incentive for partnerships and the construction of valuable 
counter terrorism initiatives similar to the FAST model discussed in Chapter VI.  The 
combination of these two options will contribute to a more centralized police scheme and 
increase capabilities to an acceptable level.  From these policy changes, the chances for 
police service mergers and total consolidation increases.   
E. FURTHER RESEARCH   
The idea of consolidating local police departments to enable greater security from 
terrorism requires a public debate.  Globalization has changed the way communities 
interact, and it appears the current model of policing does not provide for the best 
counter-terrorism apparatus to protect citizens.  Greater research is warranted in the area 
of local control of police departments.  A focus on the desire of citizens is necessary to 
determine if communities are willing to accept a reduced amount of control in exchange 
for a more robust police department most able to provide greater protection from 
terrorism.   
 
 95 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Atlantic County 2005 Final Report. Regionalization of Government Services. July 25, 
2000. http://www.aclink.org/AC2005/regional.htm. Accessed on March 21, 2006. 
 
Bush, George W. Speech Delivered to United States Congress, January 20, 2002. 
http://europe.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt. Accessed on 
March 21, 2006. 
 
Carl Vinson Institute of Government. “A Study of the Potential for Outsourcing Police  
Services in the City of St. Mary’s.” July 29, 2004. 
 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. About Us. 
http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/About+Us/Home.htm.   
Accessed on March 21, 2006. 
 
City of Pasadena, Pasadena Police Department. “Budget Grail Analysis for FY2000- 
2001”, Special Operations Division, Helicopter Section, 2000. 
 
DeHoog, R.H. and Lowery, D. “Citizen Satisfaction with Local Governance: A Test of  
Individual, Jurisdictional, and City Specific Explanations.” Journal of Politics, 
52.3 (August 1990): 807-828. 
 
Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Goal. Department of 
Homeland Security, December 2005. 
Dolan, D. “Fragmentation: Does it drive up the Costs of Government?” Urban Affairs 
Quarterly 26:1 (1990), 28-45.  
Edwards, Charles. “Democratic Control of Police: How 19th Century Political Systems 
Determine Modern Policing Structures.” History of Crime, Policing and 
Punishment Conference, December 9-10, 1999. 
http://www.aic.gov.au/conference/hcpp/edwards.pdf same Accessed on March 21, 
2006. 
Finney, Miles. “Scale Economies and Police Consolidation: Evidence from Los 
Angeles.” Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 15, January 1997. 
 
_____. “Constituency Preference and Police Consolidation: The Case of  
West Hollywood.” Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 17, April 1999. 
 
Flannery, Thomas L. "Ridge Applauds Move toward Regionalism." Sweet Liberty, 1996.  
http://sweetliberty.org/issues.regionalism./ridge.htm. Accessed on March 20,  
2005. 
 
Fournier, Ron. “FBI Chief Airs Dire Prediction.” Pasadena Star News, May 21, 2002. 
 
Gao, Helen. “Regional Police Radio Eyed.” Pasadena Star News, January 30, 2002. 
 
 96 
Gillis, Bill. “Washington State Digital Emergency Services Initiative.”  
http://www.globaltelematics.com/Digital%20ES%20Initiative.htm. Accessed on 
March 21, 2006 
 
Gilmore Commission Report, Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our 
Homeland Preserving Our Security, Vol. V, December 15, 2003. 
  
Green, Phillip D. “Life after Consolidation: Traffic Enforcement Issues.” Siren, 
December 1984. http://www.ci.larkspur.ca.us/3070.html. Accessed on March 21, 
2006 
 
Gyapont, Anthony O. and Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena. “Factor Substitution, Price 
Elasticity of Demand and Returns to Scale in Police Production: Evidence from 
Michigan.” Southern Economic Journal 54:4 (1988), 863-878. 
 
Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena. “Economies of Scale in Municipal Police Departments:  
The Case of Florida.” Review of Economics and Statistics 69:2 (1987), 352-356. 
 
Halter, Gary. "City-City Consolidations in the United States." National Civic Review, 
Vol. 82, May 1993. 
 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. Consolidating Police Services: An 
 IACP Planning Approach, May 2003. 
 
Kelling, George L., Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown “The Kansas 
City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report.” Washington D.C.: 
Police Foundation, 1974. http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/kansas.html. 
Accessed on March 21, 2006 
 
Koepsell, Terry W. and Charles M. Girard. National Institute of Law Enforcement and  
Criminal Justice; Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Small Agency 
Consolidation: Suggested Approaches. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, July 1979. 
 
Krimmel, John T. “The Northern York County Police Consolidation Experience: An  
Analysis of the Consolidation of Police Service in Eight Pennsylvania 
Communities.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and 
Management 20:3 (1997), 497-507. 
 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. “Consolidation of the Las Vegas Police  
Department and Clark County Sheriff’s Department.”  
http://www.lvmpd.com/overview/ovrcons.htm. Accessed on March 21, 2006 
 
Martin, John. “The Goal will remain the same.” Messenger-Inquirer, July 31, 1998. 
http://www.messenger-inquirer.com/vision2008/e20965.htm. Accessed on March 
21, 2006 
 97 
McAninch, Thomas and Jeff Sanders. “Police Attitudes toward Consolidation in  
Bloomington/Normal, Illinois: A Case Study.” Journal of Police Science and 
Administration 16:2 (1988), 95-104. 
 
Michigan Municipal League. “Michigan Program Tops the List of Local Innovations.” 
Michigan Municipal Review Vol. 67, November 1994. 
 
Morial, Mark. “What Locals Want.” American City & County, February 2002. 
 
Nannarone, Peter. “Law Enforcement Plan to Analyze the Feasibility of Consolidating 
Contiguous Municipal Police Agencies.” Commission on Peace Officer Standards 
and Training, Command College Class 9, Sacramento, California, 1990. 
 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Police, U.S. 
 Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1973. 
 
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. Wickersham Report.  
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933. 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks. 9/11 Commission Report. New York: Norton, 
2004. 
 
New York State Conference of Mayors. “Mayors of Rye and Rye Brook Announce Plans 
to Create Police District.” New York State Municipal Bulletin, March/April 1995. 
 
Oppal, Justice. Closing the Gap: Policing and the Community. British Columbia  
Commission of Inquiry on Police, Vol. 1, Section D, 1994.  
 
Peel Regional Police Department. “History of the Peel Regional Police Department.” 
http://www.peelpolice.on.ca. Accessed on March 21, 2006. 
 
Rubinstein, Moshe F. & Iris R. Firstenberg. The Minding Organization. New York: 
Wiley and Sons, 1999. 
 
______”Sheriff/Police Department Merger”. San Francisco Grand Jury Report, 1999- 
 2000. http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3753. Accessed on March 
21, 2006 
 
Senna, Joseph J. Introduction to Criminal Justice. New York: Wadsworth, 2002. 
 







Sniden, Peter G. "Issues Associated with Local/Regional Policing In Chautauqua."  
Fredonia Center for Rural Regional Development and Governance, 2000.  
http://www.fredonia.edu/CRRDG/RegionalPolicing_RichText.html. Accessed on 
March 21, 2006 
 
______”Community Oriented Policing Services by Maintaining a Local Identity and 
Providing Specialized Services on a Countywide Basis.” Department of Justice 
Grant Submission, Sonoma County Law Enforcement Chiefs’ Association, 1996.  
 
Tomovich, V.A. and D.J. Loree. “In Search of New Directions.” Canadian Police 
College Journal Vol. 13, Brock University, 1989. 
 
Vander Veen, Chad. “Breaking Barriers.” Government Technology, October 2005. 
 
Wabash Scientific. Indianapolis/Marion County Law Enforcement Consolidation: 
Preliminary Report, August 19, 2005   
 
White, Sammis. “Cooperation not Consolidation: The Answer for Milwaukee 









INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
Bernard K. Melekian, Chief of Police 
Pasadena Police Department 
Pasadena, California 
 
Dr. Christopher Bellavita 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
Dr. William Pelfrey 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
David Stephens, Deputy Chief 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department 
Charlotte, North Carolina 
 
Marilyn Diaz, Chief of Police 
Sierra Madre Police Department 
Sierra Madre, California 
 
